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This Article describes the power strugles among the three branches of the federal govern-
ment and Democrats and Republicans to control rulemaking and other activities at the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Although the SEC was designed to be an independ-
ent and nonpartisan agency where Commissioners and staff exercised independent judgment
and expertise to protect the investing publicfrom Wall Street depredations, partisan strugles
have undermined the agency's work. Instead of protecting the SEC from these ideological
power plays, the courts have also upended SEC rules in decisions that appear to be more
political than respectful ofgovernmental efficiency and integrity and have resulted in regulatoy
ossification. Developments that have impacted the SECs effectiveness are the imposition of
cost-benefit regulations, skepticism about deference, and the erosion of independence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) was cre-
ated as an independent federal administrative agency, designed to bolster
capitalism by exerting its specialized expertise to increase investor confi-
dence.' The agency was established in 1934, during the depths of the Great
Depression following the collapse of the stock market and the banking sys-
tem. Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initially implemented
the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), the SEC was established in 1934
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 2
The purposes of these statutes can be gleaned from their preambles. The
Securities Act is an act "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character
of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof and for other purposes."3 The Ex-
change Act is an act "[t] o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges
and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign com-
merce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes." 4 Both statutes, but
especially the Exchange Act, have been extensively amended in the more
than eighty-five years since the SEC's creation, adding to the agency's man-
date and responsibilities. 5 In 1996, Congress specifically required the SEC
1. Felix Frankfurter, who is generally credited with drafting the Securities Act, was skep-
tical that Congress could legislate to effectively administer the structure or behavior of the
modem economy. He also wondered whether a democratically elected President would ap-
point talented regulators. He therefore believed in the creation of a class of expert adminis-
trators. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 59-60
(1982).
2. Id. at 99. Because Congress did not resolve the controversies surrounding the creation
of the SEC, legislators granted the SEC authority to issue its own rules. "Congress had broadly
defined the Commission's areas of expertise and invited it to forge its own mandate." Id.
3. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74.
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881.
5. See generally Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1940)
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to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, the promotion of effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation.6
Two significant statutes which gave the SEC detailed instructions for ex-
tensive rulemaking were the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley)7
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd-Frank).8 Both of these statutes were passed as a result of serious
financial failures in the capital markets by a Congress suspicious of the secu-
rities industry and opponents of regulation.
Congress's inability to establish clear directives for the SEC to administer,
as well as efforts by Wall Street and other business interests to thwart securi-
ties regulations, created a political climate favoring the SEC's independence
and respect for its expertise. For years, courts deferred to the SEC in its
rulemaking and prosecutorial initiatives. Such deference was based on gen-
eral public respect for the work of the SEC's staff and was assisted by the
Chevron doctrine.9 If a statute pursuant to which an agency rule has been
passed is clear, the court can vacate a contrary agency rule. If the statute is
ambiguous, then an agency may have discretion to implement the statute by
rule. However, the agency's action must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 0
Closely related to the Chevron doctrine is judicial deference to an agency's
(supplementing the Securities Act of 1933 and amended by Pub. L. No. 86-760, 74 Stat. 902
(1960)); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-52 (1940); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1940); National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3426, 3437 (amending the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 97, 163 (amending the Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(1968) (amending §§ 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Securities Act of 1934); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1935) (repealed by the Energy Policy Act of
2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15801, and replaced by 42 U.S.C. § 16451 (2006)).
6. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416, 3424 (expanding the SEC's mandate to include the promotion ofefficiencies, com-
petition, and capital formation).
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
§§ 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
9. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) ("If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of au-
thority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legis-
lative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.").
10. Id. at 844.
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interpretation of its own rules." These doctrinal constructs have bolstered
the SEC's independence.
A different tenet of statutory construction curtailing agency discretion is
the "hard look" doctrine,' 2 based on the Administrative Procedure Act's
(APA's) provision that a reviewing court can set aside agency action if the
action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."'3 The "hard look," juxtaposed to Chevron, allows re-
viewing courts to utilize political preference to uphold or strike down agency
action.
Pushback against the administrative state generally, including the SEC,
began in the 1980s and continued through Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations. In 1979, Professor Homer Kripke wrote:
In general, over many years, professional opinion has given the SEC excellent ratings
on its performance .. .. Through many administrations, Democratic and Republican,
the SEC has on the whole maintained its technical competence, its energy, and its
integrity. Its staffremains at a high level ofability, filled with enthusiasm and with the
moral certainty that it is performing an important public service. 14
The compliment was overshadowed as the book rebuked the SEC's ad-
ministration of its most important goal-corporate disclosure.' 5
Skepticism about administrative agencies and regulatory reform took hold
during the Carter Administration, which threatened to undermine the SEC's
independence by curtailing the SEC's ability to represent itself in court.' 6
Although this initiative did not succeed, other ideas for supervising the SEC's
enforcement activities have been floated more recently."
Agency independence was threatened during the Reagan Administration
with the imposition of cost-benefit analyses for new rules and oversight by
11. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (When the "meaning ofthe words used [in a regulation] is in
doubt ... the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.").
12. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
13. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 561-570a, 701-706,
706(2)(A) (2012).
14. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH
OF A PURPOSE 8 (1979).
15. See generally KRIPKE, supra note 14 (oudining the problematic issues with the current
disclosure system).
16. See infia Part II.A.
17. See infra Conclusion (noting Congressional and Executive supervisory proposals).
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the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).'1 The efforts by
OIRA to control agency regulation in this way continued through Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations thereafter. Although independent
agencies like the SEC are not technically subject to cost-benefit review, some
administrations have "voluntarily" given OIRA review powers over pro-
posed regulations. Further efforts to interfere with regulation have increased
during the Trump Administration.
Although the OIRA regulatory review regime has not been applied to the
SEC, Congress amended various federal securities law statutes in 1996 to
require the Commission to consider "efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation" when determining whether rules are in the public interest. 19 This
could be viewed as a type of regulatory impact analysis.20
Proponents of the unitary executive theory attacked structures designed to
protect independent decisionmaking within the SEC with mixed success.2 '
The appointment of chairs and commissioners with close ties to either the White
House, other Executive branch agencies, or key congressional committees led to
new partisanship at the SEC and an erosion of both independence and exper-
tise. 22
Attacks on the administrative state, referred to derisively as the deep state,
have increased during the Trump Administration. Yet, it is superficial to view
these attacks as merely right-wing efforts to please business interests by derail-
ing regulation. Many of the attacks are embedded in power struggles between
the Executive,Judicial, and Legislative Branches of the government. Agencies
like the SEC have become pawns in these power struggles and have survived
them thus far by conducting themselves with specialized expertise and
18. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193-94 (Feb. 19, 1981) (creating
cost-benefit analysis requirements).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(f, 80a-2(c), 80b-2(c) (2012).
20. See Reeve T. Bull & Jerry Ellig, Statutoy Rulemaking Considerations and Judicial Review of
Regulatog Impact Analysis, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 873, 881 (2018) (discussing congressional action
around regulatory economic analysis).
21. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2054-55 (2018) (curtailing the independence of
administrative lawjudges). Efforts to derail the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) were unsuccessful. Free Entr. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (evidencing an unsuccessful effort to derail the PCAOB).
22. Muscular trade associations amplified efforts to prevent the rulemaking and vacate
existing rules. See, e.g., Part II.C (discussing attacks on the PCAOB). Furthermore, Congress
attempted to expand its influence with the passage of extremely detailed rulemaking man-
dates. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (outlining each step of the entire rulemaking mandate in
great detail); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 771-75 (illus-
trating the extremely detailed rulemaking mandates).
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dedication to the public interest. Nevertheless, the attacks are wounding, and
lead to regulatory ossification rather than efficient and effective agency deci-
sionmaking. 23
These trends need to be understood in the context of a populism that,
among other rallying cries, is pitting the poorly educated, the elderly, small
businesses, and others-those who find it difficult to cope with bureaucracy-
against intellectuals and experts who run the administrative state. Further, the
populists are often aligned with some traditional business interests that blame
regulation for their decline, or simply wish to be free of regulation to increase
their profits. Ironically, it is those who fulminate against regulation that may
need the administrative state the most. This irony can be seen regarding health
care and environmental protection 24 and has a particular pattern in securities
regulation.
Most retail investors today have their savings in mutual funds or pension
funds. Although these institutional investors are regulated, their business in-
terests are not necessarily aligned with their investors. Sophisticated inves-
tors may have significant investments in hedge funds and private equity
funds. These private funds were only brought within the ambit of SEC reg-
istration by Dodd-Frank and they are very lightly regulated. Current SEC
Chairmanjay Clayton has voiced concerns about the retail investor, but im-
portant rulemaking initiatives in recent years have acceded to the concerns
of institutional investors and financial firms.25 In part, this is because the
public interest rarely walks in the door of a rulemaking proceeding and is
difficult to quantify in a cost-benefit analysis.
This Article will discuss several topics which are relevant to an understand-
ing of attacks on the administrative state at the SEC. Part I discusses one of
the most important attacks: the imposition of a cost-benefit analysis on SEC
rulemaking and instances where the D.C. Circuit has vacated SEC rules, ei-
ther on the inadequacy ofthe cost-benefit analysis or on the somewhat related
ground that a new rule was arbitrary or capricious. Part II examines the
23. See infia Part I.E (analyzing the Regulation Best Interest Rule).
24. See generall/ Jacob Bor et al., Population Health in an Era of Rising Income Inequality: USA,
1980-2015, 389 LANCET 1475, 1475 (2017) (warning of the "health-poverty trap" and noting
that "[g] rowing survival gaps across income percentiles since 2001 reflect falling real incomes
among poor Americans as well as an increasingly strong association between low income and
poor health"); James K. Boyce, Inequality and Environmental Protection, in INEQUALITY,
COOPERATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 314 (Jean-Marie Baland et al. eds.,
2007) (reviewing the literature connecting income inequality to environmental injustice and
exposure to environmental harm).
25. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice, SEC June 5,
20 19), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-060519-iabd [hereinaf-
terJackson, Final Rules Governing Investment Advice].
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attacks orchestrated at the behest of the Executive Branch and intended to
undermine SEC independence. Finally, Part III will consider threats to Chev-
ron and related doctrines and the deference by the federal courts to the SEC's
expertise. This Article concludes with a plea for protecting the SEC against
the destructive partisanship that is weakening the administrative state, which
is designed to protect the public against special interests.
I. COST-BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
A. Conflict Between Deference and Regulatory Analysis
The deference that federal administrative agencies should be given pursu-
ant to Chevron26 has been frequently ignored, or given way to other adminis-
trative law doctrines utilized by courts when interpreting new rules by eco-
nomic regulators.27 Some judges and legislators are skeptical of Chevron
deference.
Instead of Chevron deference, the use of a cost-benefit analysis by the D.C.
Circuit in reviewing new rules passed by the SEC has in several cases led to
vacating those rules as arbitrary and capricious.28 Yet, the APA does not
require the SEC to make a cost-benefit analysis that would satisfy the stand-
ards set by OIRA. When interpreting new SEC rules promulgated pursuant
to Dodd-Frank or the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),29
the D.C. Circuit has not insisted on a cost-benefit analysis by the SEC but
has recognized that a statutory mandate needs to be followed.
Although the SEC is not required by any statute or executive order to
include a cost-benefit analysis in its rulemaking, in response to the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decisions, the agency has put in place a rigorous cost-benefit analysis
procedure. Whether this new mode of rulemaking has made the D.C. Cir-
cuit more favorably inclined to uphold SEC rulemaking is difficult to discern.
The first mandatory review procedure for administrative agencies was es-
tablished by Executive Order 12,291 in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan,
requiring new regulations be submitted to OIRA for review. 0  This
26. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(giving a federal administrative agency deference in rulemaking entrusted to the agency by stat-
ute unless the agency's determination is unreasonable, impermissible, or arbitrary).
27. Skepticism of Chevron deference within the judiciary is discussed infra Part III.
28. APA, 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, 561-570a, 701-706, 551-59 (2012).
29. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193-94 (Feb. 19, 1981); Helen G.
Boutrous, Regulatog Review in the Obama Administration: Cost-Benefit Analysis for Eveyone, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 243, 247 (2010).
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centralized review process has persisted in subsequent administrations, estab-
lishing a long-standing mechanism for executive review of agency rulemaking
to ensure that the proposed regulation strikes an acceptable balance between
costs and benefits." Cost-benefit analysis is an established means of assessing
the merits of proposed rules and has become a feature of the regulatory land-
scape over the last few decades. The analysis is "the systematic identification
of all of the costs and benefits associated with a forthcoming regulation, in-
cluding nonquantitative and indirect costs and benefits, and how those costs
and benefits are distributed across different groups in society."32
Independent regulatory agencies, like the SEC, are encouraged to conduct
cost-benefit analyses in accordance with these policies, but they are not re-
quired to do so under this regime.33 The requirement of cost-benefit analysis
may also be statutorily mandated, and the Supreme Court has held that cost-
benefit analysis may be relied upon by administrative agencies in promulgat-
ing standards and regulations even where their statutory authority is silent
on the matter.34 Cost-benefit analysis is not without its critics. The analysis
necessarily relies on ex ante assumptions made about unpredictable and non-
quantitative effects and, in some cases, is an exercise in balancing the cost of
regulation against public welfare.35 The use of cost-benefit analysis in regu-
latory review at some level, however, is widely supported among scholars.36
Democratic and Republican administrations have embraced the applica-
tion of cost-benefit analysis to agency rulemaking. Nevertheless, conserva-
tives and business groups have latched on to cost-benefit analysis to slow
government regulation or prevent new regulations from coming into force.
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit's use of the analysis has been criticized as either
political decisionmaking or otherwise inappropriate.
The debate over how, and whether, intangible benefits can be quantified
and subsequently weighed against the projected costs of new regulations is
considerable.37 In the author's opinion, to the extent the benefits of SEC
31. Boutrous, supra note 30, at 248; Benjamin Minhao Chen, hat's in a Number: Arguing
About Cost-BenefitAnalysis in Administrative Law, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 924 (2018).
32. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (2014), https://crsreports.con-
gress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41974.
33. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587, 41,587 July 14, 2011).
34. Chen, supra note 31, at 925; Entrgy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223
(2009) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
35. See CAREY, supra note 32, at 1 (explaining rationalization between "benefits not traded
in the market (e.g., health or lives)").
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-BenefitAnaysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1553, 1572 (2002).
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regulations-investor protection, fair and orderly markets, and other intan-
gible inputs that provide investors with confidence-cannot be measured in
economic terms by weighing estimated regulatory costs against aspirational
benefits is chimerical. New legislation may impose cost-benefit requirements
on the SEC; however, it is unclear what effect such legislation would have
since the SEC already goes through a fairly thorough cost-benefit exercise. 8
Further, when a new statute mandates that the SEC pass a new rule, vacating
that rule on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis is wrong, especially when
Congress has engaged in no such balancing exercise.
In four D.C. Circuit cases, SEC rulemaking was upended for want of an
adequate cost-benefit analysis. In response, the SEC created the Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA). Subsequently, in D.C. Circuit cases
reviewing new rules under Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act, the SEC's cost-
benefit analysis was either ignored or passed muster. One question raised in
these cases is whether the courts should review the SEC's cost-benefit anal-
ysis once it has been made. Another question is whether politics or principles
are driving the courts.
B. History of Cost-Benefit Analysis
According to Cass Sunstein, a cost-benefit analysis is an effort "(1) to
quantify the anticipated consequences of regulatory action and (2) to mone-
tize those consequences in terms of benefits and costs, subject to (3) a feasi-
bility constraint ... [because] some consequences may be hard or impossible
to quantify or monetize."3 9 The current formulation of this requirement,
imposed on most federal administrative agencies by OIRA, is not merely a
procedural charge but a mandate that agencies show that the benefits of a
new rule justify the costs and also that they have chosen the approach to
maximize benefits. 40
Professor Jeffrey Gordon has suggested that cost-benefit analysis origi-
nated in the torts system, where juries were allowed to determine the optimal
level of consumer product safety, workplace health and safety, or environ-
mental amenities. 41 According to John Coates, cost-benefit analysis in the
federal system began in 1936 when Congress ordered agencies to weigh the
38. See Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2017, S. 1448, 115th Cong.
§ 3(a)(6) (2017); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. § 3(b)(5) (as re-
ported by S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Feb. 14, 2018).
39. Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE LJ. F. 263,
264 (2015).
40. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 Jan. 21, 2011).
41. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. S351, S355-56 (2014).
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costs and benefits of flood control projects.4 2 In the 1970s, disillusionment
with government regulation and the high cost of federal regulation to busi-
ness in an inflationary economy led to calls for regulatory reform. 43 This
regulatory reform movement followed a period of intense congressional ac-
tivity that created new agencies with expansive regulatory reach, including
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission. 44 Therefore, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and
Carter attempted to establish procedures for coordinating and overseeing
agency rulemaking. 45
Yet, President Reagan's 1981 Executive Order 46-requiring agencies to
submit new regulations for review required OIRA to determine whether
the regulation accomplished the Administration's goals. Every subsequent
President, Democrat and Republican alike, has continued the practice. 47
From the outset, OIRA's cost-benefit review process has been controver-
sial, and has had strong proponents and detractors. Advocates claim that it is
an agency cost-control device, used by politically accountable officials to disci-
pline agencies in their rulemaking initiatives. 48 It is supposed to increase trans-
parency and enhance public engagement with the regulatory process. More-
over, cost benefit analysis has been embraced as a deregulatory tool. Perhaps
for this same reason, detractors argue that it is an effort to close down
42. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implica-
tions, 124 YALE LJ. 882, 900 (2015) [hereinafter Coates, Cost-Benefit].
43. Boutrous, supra note 30, at 247 n.24 (requesting better oversight of administrative
processes).
44. See generally ENv'T PROT. AGENCY, ORDER 1110.2, INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1970), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-
order-1 102-initial-organization-epa.html (organizing Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and establishing administrative roles within the agency); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-89) (elaborating on
the purpose and organizational structure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission); Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78) (outlining Congress's intent to authorize the Secretary of Labor to set
occupational standards through what is now known today as the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration); Energy Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-438, tit. 2, 88 Stat. 1233
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5841) (abolishing the Atomic Energy Commission
and establishing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
45. Boutrous, supra note 30, at 247.
46. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
47. Boutrous, supra note 30, at 247-48.
48. Coates, Cost-Benefit, supra note 42, at 900.
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regulatory initiatives by business groups. 49 Others have argued that federal
judges should not be reviewing agencies' cost-benefit analyses because these
analyses are merely procedural obligations and should not be made substantive
requirements.50 Detractors also argue that the essence of economic regulation
makes cost benefit requirements particularly problematic.5 '
Separation of powers issues also lead to controversy over cost-benefit anal-
ysis. OIRA's role has been criticized as improper Executive Branch interfer-
ence with agency rulemaking. For this reason, the SEC and other independent
federal agencies have resisted compliance with the executive orders requiring
that OIRA review new regulations.52 When President Carter considered
whether all agencies-independent agencies included-should give advanced
notice of their agendas, offer an analysis of the impact on major regulatory
proposals, and conduct periodic reviews of existing regulations,53 there was
strong pushback from Congress. Members of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee sent a five page letter of objections, warning that "before
you decide finally whether to include independent regulatory agencies within
the ambit of the executive order, you will consider the impact on its effective-
ness that a possible executive-legislative confrontation may have." 54 Thirteen
Senators, likewise fought to insulate the independent regulatory commissions
from presidential domination. They said that "[iun their 'unqualified view,"'
the proposed executive order "'cannot lawfully be applied to the independent
regulatory commissions' without the express approval of Congress."55
49. Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework of Function(s)
and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 1994-95 (2013); Dennis M. Kelleher et al., The Dodd-
Frank Act is Working and Will Protect the American People If It Is Not Killed Before Fully Implemented, 20
N.C. BANKING INST. 127, 136 (2016).
50. Gordon, supra note 41, at S353; Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comment: Cost-Benefit Analysis
and the Courts, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015, at 55, 56 [hereinafterJackson, Comment].
51. SeeJohn C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: A Reply, 124 YALE
LJ. F. 305, 308-09 (2015) [hereinafter Coates, Reply] (noting challenges financial regulators
face when little of the benefits can be known). Contra Paul Rose & ChristopherJ. Walker,
Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-BenefitAnalysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12-
13 (2013) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is more appropriate to economic regulation than
health and safety regulation).
52. See Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587, 41,587 (July 14, 2011) (stating that
independent agencies should promote the goal of Executive Order 13,563).
53. Improving Government Regulations, Proposed Executive Order, 42 Fed. Reg.
59,740, 59,744-45 (Nov. 18, 1977).
54. Richard E. Cohen, A Fight Over Independence, NAT'LJ., Dec. 31, 1977, at 2016, 2016
(quoting a letter from Reps. Harley 0. Staggers, D-W. Va., andJohn E. Moss, D-Cal.).
55. Id. (including the chairmen and ranking Republicans on the Governmental Affairs,
Judiciary, Commerce and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee as signatories).
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No statute expressly requires the SEC to conduct a cost-benefit analysis,
but in the 1970s the SEC began to do so voluntarily. 56 In 1996, however, the
Congress inserted into the National Securities Markets Improvement Act57
language which some viewed as a cost benefit analysis requirement, as follows:
Whenever ... the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.5 8
In addition, the Exchange Act requires the SEC to consider the impact
that any rule promulgated under that act would have on competition.59 Fur-
ther, it requires the rule's statement of basis and purpose include "the reasons
for the Commission's or the Secretary's determination that any burden on
competition imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of [the Act]." 60
Conservative members of Congress have drafted bills to impose a clearer
and more stringent cost-benefit analysis requirement upon the SEC.61 This
effort and similar efforts to involve the U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) in analyzing new regulations would appear to be a push-back
against regulation pursuant to Dodd-Frank. 62 It is somewhat disingenuous,
since Scott Garrett-the former Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee's Capital Markets Subcommittee promoted an explicit cost-
benefit analysis for SEC rulemaking, but also claimed that when the SEC
implemented theJOBS Act, a cost-benefit analysis is not required since the
JOBS Act is a deregulatory statute. 63
56. Ahdieh, supra note 49, at 1999, 1999 n.69.
57. See generally National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, H.R. 3005, 104th
Cong. (enacted) (amending securities laws and providing what some interpret as a cost-benefit
analysis mandate).
58. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106,
110 Stat. 3416, 3424. This language is in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(b)
(2018); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018); and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-2(c) (2018).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2).
61. See, e.g., SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013) (intro-
duced by former Representative Scott Garrett (R-NJ.) to establish explicit cost-benefit anal-
ysis requirements for the SEC).
62. See Coates, Cost-Benefit, supra note 42, at 921-25.
63. Maria Lokshin, Garrett Says Advancing SEC Cost-Benefit Bill A Priority, but "Timing" May
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On January 30, 2017, in the first weeks of his Administration, President
Trump signed Executive Order 13,771, titled "Reducing Regulation and
Controlling Regulatory Costs." 64 This was primarily a cost-cutting push and
a dramatic departure from the old approach of cost-benefit analysis toward
an approach that incentivizes regulations that burden industry as little as pos-
sible without any evaluation of the benefits provided.65
New guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may
change how independent agencies like the SEC are answerable for their rule-
making. OMB's memo focuses on the Congressional Review Act, which re-
quires agencies to submit a complete copy of cost-benefit analysis to both
houses of Congress for review prior to implementation of "major rules." 66
The new guidance formalizes the previously informal process by which
OIRA determined which rules count as "major:" independent agencies must
now submit an advanced notice of rules along with an analysis "sufficient to
allow OIRA to determine whether the rule is major."67 Cass Sunstein,
OIRA Administrator under President Obama, suggested in an opinion that
the new guidance could allow OIRA to dispute an agency's assessment of the
costs of a proposed rule. 68 The memo appears broad enough to encompass
less formal guidance issued by the SEC, and some have raised the question
about whether this might include no-action letters. 69 It remains unclear what
the total effect of this new guidance on the SEC will be. Some analyses indi-
cate that it could affect the agency's analytical posture with respect to new
rulemaking, while noting that it may not amount to a significant shift. 0 A
64. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017) (requiring agencies
identify two existing regulations to repeal for each new regulation).
65. Id.
66. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GUIDANCE ON
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 1, 2-4(2019), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M- 19-14.pdf.
67. Id. at 3, 5.
68. Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Trump T4/ite House SeeksNew Power OverAgencies, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 23, 2019, 11:25 A.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-
23/trump-seeks-more-control-of-fed-sec-and-other-agencies. Pro-industry voices, in contrast,
welcomed the new guidance as a "real step toward curtailing the abuses of the administrative
state." OMB Guidance on Major Rules & Regulatory Dark Matter is a Real Step Toward Stopping Regulatory
Abuses, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://cei.org/content/omb-guidance-
major-rles-regulatory-dark-matter-real-step-toward-stopping-regulatory-abuses.
69. Guidance, Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How do the Banking Agencies Regulate
and Supervise Institutions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11 6th Cong.
10 (2019), https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McCoy%20Testimony%204-
30-19.pdf (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School).
70. Congressional Review Act: OMB Memo Would Make SEC, CFTC and Other Independent Agenc's
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senior administration official anonymously characterized it as "business as
usual" for the SEC.71
Although agency utilization of cost-benefit methodologies can make regu-
lation more efficient and more transparent, it can also lead to delays in rule-
making mandated by new legislation and the deadening of initiatives for new
regulatory projects. Other statutes regulating the regulators can work a similar
effect. 7 2 Whether these laws make for better SEC rulemaking is a serious ques-
tion. In my view, they prolong the rulemaking process and create orders for
final rules published in the Federal Register unnecessarily lengthy and prolix.73
C. D.C. Circuit Court Cases Vacating SEC Rules
It is not only the Executive Branch that has been scrutinizing SEC rule-
making and favoring deregulation. In four very political cases, the D.C. Cir-
cuit vacated SEC rules on the basis of the agency's failure to conduct an ad-
equate cost-benefit analysis. 74 These cases could have been decided on other
grounds. Three cases involved line drawing between state and federal law in
'Major Rule" Analyses Subject to Executive Branch Review, ROPES & GRAY (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/04/Congressional-Review-Act-
OMB-Memo-Would-Make-SEC-CFTC-and-Other-Independent-Agencys-Major-Rule.
71. Mark SchoeffJr., Trump Administration Puts Potential New Hurdle in Path of Regulation Best
Interest, INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20190415/FREE/ 190419959/trump-administradon-puts-potenal-new-hurdle-in-path-of-
regulation.
72. See generally Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 603 (2018) (requiring federal agencies
analyze the impact of regulations upon smaller entities); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (2012) (requiring agencies to reduce the paperwork burden of the federal government);
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-12 1, 110 Stat.
847 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (regulating the regulator by more closely consid-
ering small business interests).
73. For example, in the SEC's promulgation of Regulation A-Plus (referred to as Regula-
tion A+), fifty-seven pages in the Federal Register are devoted to the details of the rule and
twenty-four pages are devoted to a cost-benefit analysis and similar other analyses required by
statute. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807-88 (Apr. 20, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260).
74. See generally Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding the
SEC Proxy Access Rule was arbitrary and capricious); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating portions of the SEC's Exemptive Rules under
the Investment Company Act of 1940); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d
133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (remanding because of issues with the 75% independent condition and
independent chairman condition); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding the SEC exceeded its authority when it issued a rule on voting power).
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corporate governance matters, and the fourth case involved preemption of
state insurance regulation. All these cases can be explained on the ground
that the court believed the SEC was intruding too far into dictating the com-
position of corporate boards of directors or other matters better left to state
law.7 5 The plaintiffs in these cases were trade associations,7 6 and in the cases
involving the regulation of mutual funds the plaintiff the Chamber of Com-
merce-had rather tenuous standing.7 7 It is unclear exactly why the court
used cost-benefit analysis to upend the regulations attacked by the plaintiffs.
Perhaps the judges believed this was a less contentious ground than federal-
ism, but the decisions have been criticized by some who think that courts
should not be reviewing cost-benefit determinations by agencies.78
In 1975, in a non-securities law case, the Supreme Court stated that
"[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stock-
holders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."79 Two
years later, the Court decided Santa Fe Industries v. Green,80 involving a claim
of breach of fiduciary duty by a board of directors in a short-form merger.8 '
The Court declined to apply Rule 1Ob-5 82 to regulate internal corporate mis-
management, stating "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we
are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state
policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."83
75. Jeffrey Gordon agrees with this analysis. Gordon, supra note 41, at S353-54.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. See id.
78. See Gordon, supra note 41, at S353 ("If applied through the machinery of the legal
system-especially hard-look judicial review that invites de novo relitigation of empirically
contestable conjectures BCA is likely to stymie regulation aimed at the reduction of systemic
risk in favor of privileging a status quo that we know is unstable."); Coates, Cost--Benefit, supra
note 42, at 909;Jackson, Comment, supra note 50, at 55 ("I argue only that, whatever position
one takes about the appropriate role of CBA in financial regulation, all should agree that the
courts should play virtually no role in conducting or reviewing that analysis."). It has been
argued that these decisions are the product of Republican judges appointed by Reagan, but I
do not agree with this somewhat facile explanation. It is true that Republican SEC commis-
sioners issued dissents in these cases, but the decisions involving investment company boards
were from a Commission chaired by William Donaldson, a Republican.
79. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
80. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
81. Id. at 464-65, 468.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
83. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479.
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This principle that state law should govern corporate internal affairs laws
in the absence of federal preemption was later applied by the Court in cases
involving investment companies. 84 In Chamber of Commerce of the United States
v. SEC,8 5 the D.C. Circuit had an opportunity to apply this principle to SEC
rulemaking involving investment company governance. 86 Instead, it vacated
a regulation on the ground of an inadequate cost-benefit analysis.87 Func-
tionally, the investment company is "a shell, a pool of assets consisting of
securities, belonging to the shareholders of the fund."88 However, invest-
ment companies in the United States are organized as corporations and have
separate advisors and underwriters. The investment company does not have
employees and its investments are managed by an affiliated organization.
These relationships give rise to a variety of conflicts of interest which are
regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Com-
pany Act).89 Among other things, the Investment Company Act requires that
at least 40% of the board of directors be independent or disinterested.90 Di-
rectors who are not independent encompass a long list of persons who have
some business or professional relationship with the investment company.9 '
Congress's purpose in structuring the Investment Company Act in this way
was to assign the disinterested directors the role of independent watchdogs to
act as an independent check on the management of the investment company.
Yet, because an investment company is the creature of its sponsor or advisor,
questions persist as to whether independent directors can provide effective
oversight of the contractual relationship between the fund and the advisor.9 2
Over the years, the SEC has conditioned a number of exemptions under
the Investment Company Act upon review and approval by independent in-
vestment company directors. Because the Investment Company Act contains
numerous sweeping prohibitions against transactions with affiliated entities
which are, in fact, commonplace, reliance on these exemptions is necessary to
permit investment companies to conduct ordinary business operations.93
84. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 477-80 (1979).
85. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 133.
87. Id. at 144.
88. Zell v. Intercapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a (2012).
90. §80a-10(a).
91. § 80a-2(a)(19) (including those affiliated with an advisor, underwriter, or broker).
92. See Div. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 264-66 (1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/invest-
ment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf.
93. For example, the exemptions permit funds to purchase securities in a primary offering
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In 2001-a time of debate over the corporate governance of public com-
panies due to a series of accounting scandals-the SEC decided to require the
boards of investment companies to have a majority of independent directors.
While no apparent crisis of confidence with respect to mutual fund govern-
ance existed, the SEC made a general bid to regulate corporate governance
and board composition, which resulted in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. 94
The SEC accomplished its goal to mandate that an investment company
board be composed of a majority of independent directors by conditioning
the operation of its exemptions under the Investment Company Act upon
such a structure. Further, the SEC required the independent directors to se-
lect and nominate the new independent directors and to hire counsel with no
substantial ties to a fund's manager.95 The SEC's method for imposing its
corporate governance ideas on mutual funds was not challenged by the fund
industry, in part because many funds' boards already had a majority of inde-
pendent directors. 96
After this rule was passed, the New York Attorney General began a wide-
spread investigation in early September 2003 into the mutual fund industry
by bringing an action involving late trading, deceptive market timing, and
sales practices by mutual funds.97 The SEC was already working on mutual
fund reform when New York's Attorney General brought these cases, but the
actions of the Attorney General spurred the SEC to greater activism. During
2003, the SEC initiated sixteen rulemaking proceedings involving mutual
where an affiliated broker-dealer is a member of the underwriting syndicate, Rule 1Of-3, 17
C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (2019), and permit the use of fund assets to pay distribution expenses. Rule
12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2019).
94. See generally Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) (Sarbanes-Oxley). See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of
William 0. Douglas The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30
DEL.J. CoRP. L. 79, 79 (2005).
95. See generally Role oflndependent Directors ofInvestment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734
Jan. 16, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270, 274) (announcing final rules re-
garding the role of independent directors in investment companies that rely on certain exemptive
rules of the Investment Company Act).
96. In my opinion, the SEC's authority for changing the statutory standard of 40% inde-
pendent directors to more than 50% could have been questioned since the statute would appear
to grant a mutual fund the right to have up to 60% of its directors be nonindependent.
97. See Complaint at 2-4, State v. Canary Capital Partners, No. 2003-402830, 2003 WL
25691660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/ar-
chived/canary-complaint.pdf; see also Ann Davis et al., Fund Probe Turns to Wall Street; Most Major
Securities Firms Face SECDemandsfor Data; Agenc Queries Eighty Mutual Funds, WALL ST.J. (Sept. 10,
2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106314336070206800.
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funds.98 After the scandals broke, the SEC and state regulators brought en-
forcement actions against nearly half of the largest mutual fund companies.99
These cases involved improper trading, abusive sales practices, and other
matters. Because of these problems, the SEC commenced further corporate
governance and other reforms of fund practices. The SEC determined,
among other things, that any fund relying on exemptions under the Invest-
ment Company Act must have a board comprised of at least 75% independ-
ent directors and a chairman of the board who is an independent director. 00
This rule was then attacked and vacated in part in Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. SEC. 0 1
The D.C. Circuit held that the SEC had authority to pass this rule and
could leverage its exemptive authority under the Investment Company Act
to regulate mutual fund corporate governance. 0 2 The court's decision was
grounded on two rationales. First, the court held that the rule was related to
a basic purpose of the Act-the tempering of conflicts of interest inherent in
the structure of investment companies. 103 In this regard, the court distin-
guished between the SEC's powers with respect to investment company cor-
porate governance and its powers related to other public companies by in-
voking its prior decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC;104 moreover, the court
suggested the SEC lacked the power under the Exchange Act to generally
mandate a separation of the CEO or Chairman positions. 0 5 The court also
interpreted the language of § 10(a) of the Investment Company Act that a
fund may have no more than 60% independent directors 0 6 to be a mini-
mum, not a maximum, standard. The court further held that the SEC's rule
"was not arbitrary, capricious, or in any way an abuse of its discretion, in
98. See Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fed. Fin. Mgmt. of te S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & GovernmentalAffairs, 108th Cong. 1-2 (2003)
(statement of Paul F. Roye, Director, Division of Investment Management, SEC), https://www.
hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 110303roye.pdf.
99. See Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of nv. Mgmt., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks
Before the ICI General Membership Meeting (May 20, 2004), http://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/spch052004pfr.htm.
100. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,382 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
101. 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102. Id. at 136.
103. Id. at 138-39.
104. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
105. 1d. at 416-7 1.
106. 15 U.S.C. §80a-1I0(a) (2012).
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violation of the APA" because the SEC can undertake prophylactic responses
to perceived risks of conflicts of interest in crafting exemptions. 0
Nevertheless, the court held that the SEC violated the APA by failing to
consider the costs imposed on funds by the new rule separating the Chairman
and CEO and suggested alternatives, particularly a disclosure alternative. 0 8
This holding essentially endorsed the dissenting views of Commissioners At-
kins and Glassman when the rule was adopted.1 09 On June 30, 2005, nine
days after the Court of Appeals opinion was released, the SEC reaffirmed its
promulgation of the rule, claiming that it had decided that the benefits of the
rule outweighed its costs and disclosure of investment company conflicts of
interest were of limited utility. In fact, the primary justification for the affir-
mance appeared to be that Chairman Donaldson was resigning the next day.
Commissioners Glassman and Atkins filed two strong dissents. 0
The SEC did not reopen its rulemaking for further comment on the ground
that it had previously called for comment on the costs of complying with the
new rule. However, based on materials not in the rulemaking record, includ-
ing a widely used industry survey, the SEC determined a range of costs for
the options a fund might use to meet the 75% independent director condition.
With regard to the new requirement for an independent chair, the SEC as-
sumed costs would derive principally from increased compensation and addi-
tional staff. The SEC then concluded that the costs would be extremely small
relative to fund assets for which boards are responsible and relative to the
expected benefits. The SEC also asserted that nearly 60% of all funds then
met the 75% independent director requirement.
The D.C. Circuit held that, although the SEC was not required to engage
in additional fact gathering on remand, the agency's extensive reliance upon
extra-record materials in arriving at its cost estimates required further oppor-
tunity for comment."' Since these materials were primary and not merely
supplementary, the court held that the SEC violated the comment require-
ment of the APA." 2 However, vacating the rule which a majority of funds
had already complied with would be disruptive, so the court decided to vacate
107. Chamber of Commerce of the US., 412 F.3d at 141.
108. I1d. at 136.
109. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,390-93 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (comments of dissenting Commissioners fauling the promulga-
non of the rule for failure to properly consider costs of implementation as well as less costly alter-
natives).
110. Investment Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390, 39,403, 39,405-06 (July
7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (comments ofdissenting Commissioners lambast-
ing the Commission's rushed response in light of the circumstances).
S11. Chamber of Commerce of the US., 412 F.3d at 142-44.
112. Id.
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for ninety days the 75% independent director and independent chair condi-
tions." 3 After a new Chairman was appointed, the SEC did not go forward
with this rulemaking or case. 114 Nevertheless, most mutual funds voluntarily
conformed their governance to the SEC's regulation." 5
Another rebuff to the SEC based on an inadequate cost-benefit analysis
was the decision in American Equity Investment Life Insurance v. SEC," 6 in which
the D.C. Circuit Court vacated Rule 15 1A categorizing fixed index annu-
ities as securities-under the Securities Act."' Although annuities are ex-
empt from the Securities Act, variable annuities are not." 8 In the mid-i 980s,
the SEC passed Rule 151 to provide an exemption from the Securities Act
for guaranteed investment contracts which were subject to state insurance
regulation where the insurer assumes the investment risk under the contract
and the contract is not marketed primarily as an investment.19
In the mid-1990s, insurance companies began marketing fixed index an-
nuities, but the SEC did not attempt to regulate them until 2007 when it
passed Rule 15 1A. By this time, the amount of such assets totaled $123 bil-
lion.1 20 The decision vacating this rule is curious. First, the court did an anal-
ysis under the Chevron doctrine and found that the exemption for annuities was
ambiguous, but the SEC's rule was reasonable.121 Then the court found the
SEC contravened § 2(b) of the Securities Act because it failed to adequately
consider the efficiency, competition, and capital formation effects of the Rule
151 A; therefore, promulgation of Rule 151 A was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law under the
APA.1 22 Although the subject matter of this case involved an intersection be-
tween federal and state regulation of an insurance company product, the court
did not examine whether state regulation of the product was adequate or com-
prehensive.
113. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(remanding to the SEC to address cost issues).
114. THOMAS P. LEMKE, ET AL., 1 REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 6.03 [1]
(2019).
115. See Chamber of Commerce ofthe US., 443 F.3d at 908 (noting that nearly 60% of mutual
funds had already complied).
116. 613 F.3d 166 (2010).
117. Id. at 167-68, 179 (defining fixed index annuities as "hybrid financial product[s] that
combine[] some ofthe benefits of fixed annuities with the added earning potential of a security").
118. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1967) (citing SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. ofAm. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65 (1959)).
119. 17C.F.R.§230.151(a)(2019).
120. American Equity nv. Life Ins., 613 F.3d at 170.
121. Id. at 173-74.
122. Id. at 177-79.
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Another example of a case in which the D.C. Circuit struck down an SEC
rule in the governance area is the SEC's proxy access rule in Business Roundtable
v. SEC.1 23 Since it was more difficult for the court to claim that the SEC had
no role in the corporate governance ofpublic companies after Sarbanes-Oxley
and since Congress gave the SEC authority to pass a proxy access rule in
Dodd-Frank,1 24 the court had some difficulty in determining that the SEC
rulemaking was beyond its authority. Therefore, it upended the proxy access
rule on the basis of an inadequate cost-benefit analysis.12 5
The regulation of proxy voting has resided at the intersection between
federal and state law since the Exchange Act was passed in 1934. Although
state law controls the holding of annual meetings to elect directors and the
corporate governance aspects of proxy voting, federal securities laws control
the solicitation of proxies. In 1977, shareholder activists began trying to per-
suade the SEC to revise rules to allow competing shareholder nominees to
be included in opposition to the board of directors' nominees. Following a
2003 SEC staff report,1 26 the SEC proposed a series of controversial rules to
allow proxy access by institutional investors, but it was not until 2010 that
Rule 14a-1 1 to this effect was finally adopted.1 27
Corporate voting rights are generally fixed by a corporation's charter.
The nature and extent of shareholder voting rights, as well as the mechanics
of holding annual meetings to elect directors, are generally specified by state
law. Yet, because shareholders in public companies are geographically dis-
persed, proxy voting is the dominant mode of shareholder decisionmaking,
and the SEC regulates solicitation of proxies by public companies. Sec-
tion 14(a) of the Exchange Act 28 makes it unlawful for any person to solicit
any proxy, consent, or authorization with respect to any security registered
123. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. I11-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.§ 78n(a) (2012)).
125. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156 (lambasting the SEC's renationalization of cost as
"unutterably mindless").
126. See generally DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY
PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS (2003),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf (recommending rules to allow sharehold-
ers to place their director nominees on the corporation's proxy materials after SEC Staff of the
Division of Corporate Finance completed a review of SEC rules and regulations regarding di-
rector nominations and elections).
127. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668,
56,782 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012).
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under § 12 of the Exchange Actl29 in contravention of the SEC's proxy
rules. 130
In addition to prescribing the materials that must be sent to stockholders
with a proxy solicitation, the proxy rules provide the right to make share-
holder proposals, which the company is required to include in its proxy so-
licitation as long as the proponent meets all of the requirements of Rule 14a-
8. Until Rule 14a-8 was amended, simultaneously with the SEC's adoption
of proxy access in Rule 14a- 11, Rule 14a-8(i)(8) permitted corporations to
omit any shareholder proposal that related to an election to office.' 3'
In 2003 and 2007, the SEC proposed proxy access rules, which were never
finalized because of intense opposition and the lack of consensus at the Com-
mission level.' 32 Both proposals would have limited proxy access to large
shareholders who had held stock for a long period of time. In connection
with these proposed rules, the SEC put out suggestions to change the exclu-
sion for shareholder proposals relating to elections."13
In the meantime, the SEC's interpretation of its shareholder proposal rule
was challenged in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v.
American International Group, Inc. 134 The Second Circuit invalidated the SEC's
interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and challenged the SEC to reinterpret the
election exclusion or pass a new rule. 1s In response, the SEC confirmed its
position that shareholder proposals that could result in an election contest
may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), but sought comment as to whether
the text of the rule should be changed.1 36 The SEC's reaffirmation of its in-
terpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), and its 2007 proxy access rule proposal were
both put out by a 3-2 vote, with Chairman Christopher Cox voting with the
two Democratic commissioners on the proxy access rule proposal and with
the two Republican commissioners with regard to the interpretative release
on Rule 14a-8.
129. § 781.
130. 17 C.F.R. §§ 24014a-3-17 (2019).
131. § 14a-8(i)(8).
132. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784-85 (proposed
Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (proposing rules requiring compa-
nies to give shareholders access to corporate proxy materials in certain circumstances for inclu-
sion of director nominees); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed.
Reg. 43,488, 43,492 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing a
rule that would regulate shareholder director nominations that are not control-related).
133. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,492-93.
134. 462 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
135. Id. at 129-31.
136. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,492.
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This political impasse at the Commission level shifted with the election of
President Obama and Mary Schapiro's accession to SEC Chairman. In
2010, the SEC adopted Rule 14a- 11, which provided that shareholders or a
group of shareholders who have held 3% of a company's voting securities for
at least three years prior to the date of a director nomination could nominate
up to 25% of the directors of a board. This rule was applicable to both public
companies and investment companies. The two Republican commissioners
dissented from the promulgation of the rule.
In holding that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously for failing ade-
quately to assess the economic effects of its proxy access rule, the D.C. Circuit
in Business Roundtable determined that the SEC failed to appreciate the inten-
sity with which issuers would oppose nominees pursuant to Rule 14a- 11 and
did not adequately assess the costs and frequency of potential election con-
tests.' Very importantly, the court also asserted that the SEC acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously by failing to consider how union and state pension
funds might utilize Rule 14a- 11 to gain concessions unrelated to shareholder
value. 138 It is this finding that comes to grips with the political issue at the
heart of the proxy access debates.
Not all shareholders believe that proxy access would be desirable or that a
greater number of proxy contests would increase shareholder values. The
advocates for proxy access have primarily been union and government pen-
sion funds. Mutual funds have opposed proxy access both as applied to their
own organizations and as investors in other companies. Retail investors do
not seem to have been considered in the SEC's deliberations since few of them
would own a sufficient number of shares to take advantage of proxy access.
The D.C. Circuit Court chastised the SEC for its inadequate cost-benefit
analysis and for passing a rule for the benefit of only certain investors.' 9
Since the petitioners who sued the SEC to abrogate Rule 14a- 11 did not
also attempt to strike down the SEC's amendment to Rule 14a-8, the SEC
determined that this amendment would become final. It therefore became
possible for shareholders to make proposals to alter the procedures for elect-
ing directors and to request proxy access by-laws. Delaware eagerly jumped
into this fault line between SEC and state regulation of proxy access; through
court decision 40 and legislation,141 proxy access became a matter of private
ordering rather than SEC regulation.
137. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
138. See id. (noting comments that anticipated investors pursuing self-interested objectives
rather than those of unions and state and local governments).
139. Id. at 1152.
140. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008).
141. H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2009) (enacted and added to§ 112 to Del. Code, tit. 8).
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In this case, inadequate cost-benefit analysis was a somewhat thin reed
for the D.C. Circuit to rest its invalidation of the SEC proxy access rule since,
as the foregoing shows, the SEC had been considering this regulation for
many years and there was a voluminous comment record favoring the new
rule. The decision was a political policy rejection of the SEC's intrusion into
corporate internal affairs. The court simply made use of an available admin-
istrative law tool-cost-benefit analysis-to justify its determination. Nev-
ertheless, the foregoing decisions were a wake-up call to the SEC to revise
and improve its methodology for cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking. The
SEC also was further pressured to beef up its cost-benefit methodology by a
report of the GAO 42 and a report of the SEC Inspector General.1 43
In September 2009, the SEC created the DERA to integrate financial eco-
nomics and rigorous data analytics into the SEC's core mission. In 2012, the
Office of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation and the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel of the SEC prepared a memorandum to all rule writing divisions
and offices setting forth a methodology for cost-benefit analyses.1 44 This Guid-
ance outlined the features of a cost-benefit analysis for rulemaking as follows:
(1) a statement of the need for the proposed action; (2) the definition of a baseline
against which to measure the likely economic consequences of the proposed regulation;
(3) the identification of alternative regulatory approaches; and (4) an evaluation of the
benefits and costs both quantitative and qualitative-of the proposed action and the
main alternatives identified by the analysis.1 45
The SEC's methodology for creating a cost-benefit analysis differs from
OIRA's methodology and has been criticized on that ground.1 46 Other crit-
icisms also have been leveled at the SEC's methodology, but the D.C. Circuit
seems pacified. The SEC's new effort for preparing a cost-benefit analysis
in rulemaking became an issue in the many rules-some quite controver-
sial-that the SEC was required to pass pursuant to Dodd-Frank and the
JOBS Act. Ironically, the D.C. Circuit has not vacated any of the rules im-
plementing these statutory provisions.
142. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND
COORDINATION 9-12, 37-39 (2011).
143. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS, REPORT No. 499 12-14 (2012).
144. Memorandum from SEC, Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin., and SEC, Office of the Gen.
Counsel, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices regarding Current Guidance on Economic
Analysis in SEC Rulemakings, I (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-g
uidanceeconanaly-secrulemaking.pdf.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor We/fare or To-
tal Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 89-90 (2015).
230 [72:2
ATTACKS ON THEADMINISTRATVESTATEATTHE SEC
For many years, the SEC was afforded deference by the courts to its rule-
making. In recent years, however, the D.C. Circuit has given the SEC little
deference. What happened? I believe two developments account for this
change. First, Washington has become extremely political and dysfunc-
tional, and judges-along with the public-no longer respect expertise. Sec-
ond, as long as the SEC was limited to the regulation of the securities indus-
try, and the securities industry generally went along with SEC regulation,
there were few challenges to SEC rulemaking. When the SEC's remit spread
to general corporations, however, beginning with Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002
and then further expanded by Dodd-Frank, business interests began to ag-
gressively push back against SEC rulemaking. Certain well-funded trade as-
sociations, especially the U.S. Chamber of Commerce led by Tom J.
Donohue, and the Business Roundtable, have targeted SEC rulemaking.1 47
Cost-benefit analysis has been thrust upon the SEC and it has endeavored
to comply with this assignment, but by and large neither the costs nor the ben-
efits of new rules are reasonably ascertainable. When the D.C. Circuit disa-
grees with a policy encapsulated into an SEC rule, defects with the SEC's cost-
benefit analysis is an easy basis for vacating the rule. Of course, one could
argue that Chevron deference is similarly an easy way for a court to uphold a
new SEC rule.1 48
The APA requires all proposed rules to be published in the Federal Register.
Most SEC rule proposals are detailed and lengthy. Affected business interests
and the public then have time to comment on the rules, and these comments
are painstakingly reviewed by the SEC's staff. After this long and transparent
process, good government would not seem to require that business interests get
another bite at the apple by taking the SEC to court and attacking new rules
on grounds that do not really go to the merits of the rule or obvious procedural
defects in the rulemaking process. This is a game of raw politics that is a dis-
service to the SEC, the public, and even regulated business interests.
D. Dodd-Frank and JOBS Act Rulemaking
Where new rulemaking is conducted pursuant to a regulatory mandate,
the response of the courts to a cost-benefit analysis challenge has been dif-
ferent than in the cases discussed above. Similarly, the courts have been
147. They have been helped in their efforts by cases successfully prosecuted by Eugene
Scalia, son of Antonin Scalia, before a conservative D.C. court. See Patrick Caldwell, Did You
Know That Antonin Scalia's Son Is Sabotaging Wall Street Reform?, MOTHERJONES (July-Aug. 2014),
http://www.motherjones.com/poliics/2014/07/eugene-scalia-court-antonin-financial-reform.
148. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(stating that "[i] f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express dele-
gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation").
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unsympathetic to a lack of a cost-benefit analysis by the SEC when the Com-
mission has engaged in deregulation.
Dodd-Frank is a formidable regulatory statute which required more than
twenty federal agencies to promulgate 400 new rules.1 49 The SEC was given
a particularly heavy workload required to engage in ninety mandatory rule-
making proceedings and twenty studies.15 0 The SEC had little discretion with
regard to many of the particularly controversial rulemaking proceedings.
This did not stop business groups from attempting to strike down new SEC
rules on cost-benefit and other grounds. Where the SEC had so little maneu-
verability, the D.C. Circuit did not accept the cost-benefit challenges to the
new rules, although it did strike down parts of the rules on other grounds.' 5
Even before the SEC completed its assigned rulemaking tasks pursuant to
Dodd-Frank, Congress passed theJOBS Act, a deregulatory statute. Dereg-
ulatory rulemaking is subject to the same administrative law requirements as
new regulations,1 52 and in a case involving preemption of state blue-sky law,
two state blue-sky commissioners sued the SEC to vacate a deregulatory rule,
on cost-benefit grounds.15 The D.C. Circuit upheld the SEC's rule.
Some of the rules Congress ordered the SEC to promulgate in Dodd-
Frank did not even purport to be about investor protection. Section 1502 of
Dodd-Frank mandated that the SEC require registered and reporting com-
panies under the Exchange Act to disclose whether "conflict minerals" from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries are
necessary for the functionality or production of any of their manufactured
products. The rationale for this rule was to achieve a humanitarian goal.1 5 4
The SEC carried out its conflict minerals mandate by adopting Rule 13p-
1 and Form SD. If an issuer determines it is covered by the conflict minerals
rule, it must conduct a reasonable country-of-origin inquiry to determine
149. Paul Rose & ChristopherJ. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 9 (2013).
150. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFHCE, GAO-13-195, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM: REGULATORS HAVE FACED CHALLENGES FINALIZING KEY REFORMS AND
UNADDRESSED AREAS POSE POTENTIAL RISKS 44 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
651401 .pdf (acknowledging the GAO's recommendations around rulemaking).
151. See infia notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
152. FCC v. Fox Television Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
153. See infia notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). War in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (DRC) had
led to the deaths of millions of civilians and it had been financed by groups profiting from the
sale of conflict minerals, which are found in most electronic products and other consumer goods.
The rule was intended to limit the purchases ofthe conflict materials by making consumers more
informed on the products they were purchasing and to make companies aware of the conflicts
the products were involved with funding.
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whether these minerals originated in the DRC. If so, the issuer must exercise
reasonable due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict
minerals and certify a third-party audit of those products that have not been
found to be DRC conflict free.
The estimated costs of these efforts were thought to be huge. In making a
cost-benefit analysis of Rule 13p-1, the SEC essentially accepted estimates of
the National Association of Manufacturers and a Tulane Law School study. A
scathing critique of the SEC's cost estimates argued that quantified cost ben-
efit analysis should never have been imposed on the SEC and should be elim-
inated.1 55 Regardless, the D.C. Circuit upheld the SEC's cost-benefit analysis
because the SEC "exhaustively analyzed the final rule's costs," and found that
the rule would "impose competitive costs, but have relatively minor or offset-
ting effects on efficiency and capital formation."15 6 Further, the SEC argued
that it lacked the data to quantify the benefits of the rule. The D.C. Circuit
agreed, stating that "the rule's benefits would occur half-a-world away in the
midst of an opaque conflict about which little reliable information exists, and
concern a subject about which the Commission has no particular expertise." 57
This holding could easily be applied to virtually all cases where the D.C.
Circuit has analyzed SEC's cost-benefit quantification. As to the conflicts-
mineral rule, the court could not resist continuing to interfere with the SEC's
rulemaking. Despite upholding the Commission's cost-benefit analysis, the
court nevertheless decided to vacate a portion of the rule, holding that its
"name-and-shame" feature violated the First Amendment. 5 8
The conflict-minerals rule was generally controversial and unpopular.
Attempts to repeal the rule have so far failed,1 59 but the rule is no longer
enforced.1 60 There is some irony to this nonenforcement as a deregulatory
initiative since companies had learned to develop procedures for complying
155. Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-BenefitAnalysis and the Conflict Minerals Rule, 68
ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 290-94 (2016); see alsoJoshua T. White, Quantjied Cost-BenefitAnalysis at the
SEC, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 53, 54-55 (2016).
156. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
157. Id. (further articulating the impracticability of quantifying the final rule's benefits as
it "would create an apples-to-bricks comparison").
158. Id. at 372-73.
159. See Conflict Minerals Face Uncertain Future, NAT'L. L. REV. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/conflict-minerals-rule-faces-uncertain-future.
160. See Michael S. Piwowar, Public Statement, Statement ofActing Chairman Piwowar on We
Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.se
c.gov/news/public-statement/piwowar-statement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule.
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with the rule and-due to pressure from activist investors-have continued
to follow it. 161
The foregoing cases were challenges from business groups. Lindeen v.
SEC1 62 was a challenge by the blue-sky commissioners of Massachusetts and
Montana to a deregulatory rule, known as "Regulation A-Plus," passed by
the SEC pursuant to the JOBS Act. The challenge is of interest because it
was an attack from the left rather than the right-to SEC rulemaking, and
also because the D.C. Circuit rejected a cost-benefit analysis challenge to the
SEC's rulemaking and instead applied the Chevron doctrine.1 63
Under § 3(b) of the Securities Act, the SEC has authority to exempt from
the registration requirements an offering of a small amount or a limited pub-
lic offering.1 64 For many years, this exemption was limited to five million
dollars or less, but the JOBS Act raised the amount to $50 million. The
JOBS Act also directed the SEC to revamp Regulation A to make it more
desirable. The SEC complied by expanding Regulation A into two tiers-
Tier 1 for offerings up to $20 million and Tier 2 for offerings up to $50 mil-
lion.1 65 Although the JOBS Act did not exempt offerings made under
§ 3(b)(2) from state law securities regulation requirements, Congress allowed
the SEC to do so. Section 18(b)(4) of the Securities Act provides that§ 3(b)(2)
securities are "covered securities" for purposes of § 18 if they are offered or
sold on a national securities exchange, or "offered or sold to a qualified pur-
chaser." 166 In crafting Regulation A-Plus, the SEC took advantage of this
provision by defining a "qualified purchaser" as any person to whom securi-
ties are offered or sold in a Tier-2 Regulation A-Plus offering.1 67 The SEC
justified this preemption of state blue-sky laws based on limitations on invest-
ment amounts by purchasers in such offerings, the provision of audited fi-
nancial statements, and a requirement for annual reporting.
State blue-sky commissioners sued the SEC, arguing that a "qualified pur-
chaser" needed to be a credentialed purchaser. The D.C. Circuit rejected
161. Marc Butler, 14y the Conflict Minerals Rule Refuses to Die, INTELLIGIZE (June 21, 2018),
https://www.intelligize.com/why-the-conflict-minerals-rule-refuses-to-die/.
162. 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
163. Id. at 162-63, 165-66.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012).
165. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemption Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,903 (Apr. 20, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
167. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemption Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,899.
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this challenge by giving the SEC Chevron deference.1 68 One argument by the
state securities regulators was that the SEC's rulemaking was arbitrary and
capricious because its cost-benefit justification for Regulation A-Plus was
too cryptic and did not adequately explain how Tier 2's safeguards would
mitigate the cost of preemption or provide evidence regarding preemption
costs. The D.C. Circuit gave short shrift to this argument by stating that
the SEC was not required to "measure the immeasurable" or "conduct a
rigorous, quantitative economic analysis unless the statute explicitly directs
it to do so." 169
The cases discussed in this Part are difficult to reconcile except on political
grounds. Unfortunately, the partisanship in Congress has infected the SEC.
Many commissioners are now chosen in pairs and both the Democratic and
Republican commissioners frequently come from congressional staffs. They
have continued congressional quarrels concerning financial regulation by is-
suing vigorous dissents from SEC rulemakings that have laid the ground for
D.C. Circuit opinions, some of which also divide by party as the majority
opinion adopts cost-benefit analysis, Chevron deference, or another form of
statutory construction to justify striking down or upholding a new SEC rule.
E. The Best Interest Rule
The political struggles between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Branches, as well as the partisan struggles between Democrats and Republi-
cans and between business and consumer advocates, can be seen impacting
the regulatory responsibilities of the SEC in the battles leading up to the 2019
promulgation of a best interest rule for financial firms. The SEC's Regulation
Best Interest (best interest rule or Regulation BI) occurred after a nine-year
struggle to formulate a rule based on a simple and basic concept-brokers
should put the interests of their customers ahead of their own interests when
making a recommendation for the purchase or sale of a security.
The SEC's best interest rule has a long and tortured history. The prob-
lems with the promulgation of the rule are embedded in differences between
the regulation of brokers and the regulation of investment advisers. The SEC
articulated the relationship between brokers and their customers in the
1960's as the "shingle theory." 7 0 This doctrine-developed by the SEC in
administrative law cases-is that brokers impliedly represent that they will
168. Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 656-57 (holding that the SEC's definition ofa qualified purchaser
satisfied Chevron step two).
169. Id. at 658 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
170. See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (discussing the expected
conduct of business for brokers and dealers in securities); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle
Theoy Dead?, 52 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1271, 1273-80 (1995) (describing the shingle theory).
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deal fairly with their customers and rests on an assumption that broker-deal-
ers have fiduciary responsibilities to their clients. When a broker is acting as
an agent such an assumption may rest on common law agency principles,
but when a broker is acting as a principal or dealer, such an assumption may
not be valid-at least under common law principles. Yet, broker-dealers
commonly sell securities to both institutional and retail customers as princi-
pal, for example in initial public offerings or when securities are sold from a
broker-dealer's inventory. Further, securities firms often sell firm-created or
proprietary products to their customers.
Investment advisers, by contrast, have been held to owe fiduciary duties
to their customers by an early Supreme Court case interpreting the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).' 7 ' An important difference be-
tween the regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers is that broker-
dealers are required by law to belong to a self-regulatory organization (cur-
rently the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA))17 2 but advisers
have never established such a self-regulatory organization. Further, there
are many more investment advisers than broker-dealers.
Although there is some question as to whether a customer can enforce the
shingle theory in a securities case under the anti-fraud provisions,'73 most
cases by customers against broker-dealers are prosecuted in FINRA arbitra-
tions. 7 4 Instead of a general fiduciary duty regulation, FINRA has numer-
ous specific rules enforcing obligations by brokers to their customers, includ-
ing a very important suitability rule. 75
While many financial firms are dually registered as broker-dealers and in-
vestment advisers, many are not. Customers may be only brokerage firm
customers and not investment adviser customers, or they may be both. His-
torically, compensation by brokerage firm customers was transaction fee-
based, whereas investment advisers charged fees based on assets under man-
agement. In 1995, a commission led by Daniel Tully, Chairman and CEO
of Merrill Lynch, recommended that fee-based accounts at broker-dealers
was a way to minimize conflicts of interest between brokers and retail
171. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) (interpreting
§ 206 of the Investment Advisers Act).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (outlining "registration and regulation of brokers and dealers").
173. See Karmel, Is the Shingle Theoy Dead?, supra note 170, at 1273-80.
174. See FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-task-force-
report.pdf ("FINRA is, for all practical purposes, the sole arbitration forum in the United States
for resolving disputes between broker-dealers, associated persons, and customers.").
175. FINRA, RULE 2111: SUITABILITY (2014), https://www.finra.org/rules-guid-
ance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 #the-rule.
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customers.17 6 The change in compensation from brokerage commissions to
fees on assets in an account conveniently coincided with ever decreasing bro-
kerage commission charges after the unfixing of commissions in 1975.177
The change in compensation for broker-dealers from transaction-based rev-
enues to ongoing fees created a problem regarding the exemption from Advis-
ers Act registration for broker-dealers. The Advisers Act excludes from the
definition of "investment adviser" any broker or dealer that provides advisory
services when such services are "solely incidental" to the conduct of the broker
or dealer's business and when such incidental advisory services are provided
for no special compensation.17 8 In 1999, the SEC proposed a rule exempting
fee-based brokerage accounts from the fiduciary requirements of the Advisers
Act. The Financial Planning Association perceived a threat to its fee-only in-
vestment advisers and sued the SEC; the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC rule.' 79
These developments occurred in the context of a significant change in re-
tirement savings by individuals. Many companies eliminated corporate-de-
fined benefit compensation plans. For this reason and because of favorable
tax treatment for individual retirement accounts (IRAs), there was a huge
shift of individuals to IRAs and other individually managed retirement ac-
counts. 8 0 The Obama Administration became concerned that retail inves-
tors were not being fully informed or fairly treated when making decisions
about such accounts, particularly about roll overs of corporate benefit pen-
sions into IRAs. Therefore, the Treasury Department released a report out-
lining ways to increase fairness for investors that proposed the SEC "[e] stab-
lish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering investment advice and
harmonize the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers."181
In 2010, there were two important developments that set up a conflict
between the Department of Labor (DOL), an Executive branch agency, and
the SEC. Dodd-Frank gave the SEC the authority to harmonize the fiduci-
ary standard for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers who provide per-
176. SEC, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES (1995),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt.
177. See Leslie Wayne, Is Wall Street Ready for Mayday 2?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1985),
https://www.nytimes.com/ 1985/04/28/business/is-wall-street-ready-for-mayday-2.html.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2012).
179. Fin. Planning Ass'n. v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
180. James McWhinney, The Demise of the Defined-Benefit Plan, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/06/demiseofdbplan.asp (last updated Feb. 18, 2020).
181. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATIONS 71 (2009), https:
//www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReportweb.pdf.
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sonalized investment advice to clients.18 2 Dodd-Frank also directed the SEC
to conduct a study to evaluate "the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory
standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, ... and persons
associated with investment advisers for providing personalized investment
advice and recommendations about securities to retail customers . . . ."183
Not content with giving the SEC discretion to shape such a study, the statute
enumerated fourteen specific items for consideration. 184
The SEC staffs Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers was
released in January 2011, over the dissenting votes of the two Republican
SEC commissioners.1 8 5 The study recommended that the SEC promulgate
a harmonized uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment
advisers. However, there was a serious lack of consensus at the Commission
regarding such a recommendation and so no such rule proposal was issued
until 2018. 186
In the meantime, in September 2010, the DOL issued a proposed rule de-
signed to limit conflicts of interest for financial advisers working with client
retirement accounts. 87 This rule would have applied not only to existing Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) "fiduciaries" but to broker-
dealers, investment advisers, and insurance agents making recommendations to
accounts regulated under ERISA and IRAs.1 88 This rule proposal was ex-
tremely controversial because of its broad reach and because it purported to cre-
ate a private right of action for breaches of the rule.1 89 DOL withdrew its con-
flicts of interest rule in September 2011 and predicted it would issue a re-
proposal in 2012.
In 2013, the SEC released a request for comment on the costs and benefits
of a uniform fiduciary duty rule and harmonization of adviser and broker
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note (2012) (Study and Rulemaking Regarding Obligations of Bro-
kers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
186. See generally Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574 (May 9, 2018) (to be cod-
ified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (soliciting comments on the proposed rule establishing a code of
conduct for those associated with a broker-dealer).
187. See JOHNJ. TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44884,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 2016 FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 7-8 (2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44884.
188. See Stephen Miller, DOL's Proposed Definition of "Fiduciagr" Draws Fire, Support, SHRM
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regulations.190 This release resembled a July 2011 proposal of the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). Also in 2013, Thomas
Perez was confirmed as Secretary of DOL and promised to listen to stakehold-
ers before deciding how to proceed with a fiduciary rule.191 Then, in 2015,
President Obama directed the DOL to re-propose its fiduciary rule and protect
retirees from conflicted advice.1 92 The DOL did so in April 2015 by proposing
a rule that required fiduciary advice for all retirement accounts, including
IRAs. The DOL held four days of hearings and received 3,000 comment let-
ters many of them negative. During the fall of 2015, the financial industry,
Republican lawmakers, and Republican SEC Commissioner Daniel Gal-
lagher attacked the DOL rule. Legislation was introduced to block the rule,
which Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren and supportive consumer
groups opposed.'19
Some of the opposition to the DOL rule that came from the securities
industry argued that the SEC, not the DOL, should be passing a fiduciary
rule to avoid having two sets of rules for brokerage accounts. The SEC did
not, however, have the votes for such a rule. In 2015, SEC Chairman Mary
Jo White announced her personal support for a fiduciary duty rule but cau-
tioned that she did not have sufficient Commission support.
On April 6, 2016, DOL released the final version of its fiduciary rule. 194
The Chamber of Commerce promptly filed a lawsuit to vacate the rule. Alt-
hough the DOL's rule was upheld in the district court, it was vacated in a
split decision by the Fifth Circuit.1 95 The grounds for the court's opinion
were that the rule exceeded the DOL's statutory authority because it applied
to IRA accounts and that it was arbitrary and capricious because it only ap-
plied to certain insurance company products.1 96
OnJune 5, 2019, the SEC finally approved Regulation BI, in a split vote.
The sole Democratic Commissioner, RobertJackson, dissented. Kara Stein,
a former Democratic Commissioner, had dissented from the proposed rule,
190. Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisors, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,848
(Mar. 7, 2013).
191. Melanie Waddell, DOL Chief Perez Prepared to Explain Final Fiduciay Rule,
THINKADVISOR (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/03/28/dol-chief-pe-
rez-prepared-to-explain-final-fiduciary-rule/.
192. TOPOLESKI & SHORTER, supra note 187, at 8.
193. Mark SchoeffJr., As DOL Fiduciay Rule Heats Up, Both Sides Dg In, INVESTMENTNEWS
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20151004/FREE/310049995/as-
dol-fiduciary-heats-up-both-sides-dig-in.
194. Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Invest-
ment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016).
195. Chamber of Commerce ofthe U.S. v. Dep't of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 2018).
196. Id. at 387-88.
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which she dubbed "regulation status quo."1 97 The SEC's Consumer Advo-
cate also criticized the final rule and related interpretative releases regarding
the investment adviser exemption for broker-dealers. This long saga is an
example of partisan squabbling set off by lobbying from industry and con-
sumer groups-and power struggles between the Executive and Congress
over the role of the SEC vis-Ai-vis the DOL.
The appropriate content of a fiduciary rule necessary to protect the sav-
ings of retail investors was perhaps lost in the fog of partisan warfare. This
kind of Washington Theater, in my opinion, does not result in good govern-
ment, but rather regulatory ossification.1 98 Regulation BI's adopting release
is 771 pages of explanation and cost-benefit analysis but it does not materi-
ally change broker customer relationships.1 99 It does add extensive new dis-
closure and compliance obligations to brokers, continuing a rule-based re-
gime rather than substituting a fiduciary standard. Regulation BI does
outlaw some egregious conflict of interest sales practices including sales con-
tests, sales quotas, bonuses, and noncash compensation based on the sales of
specific securities or types of securities within a limited timeframe.
The SEC's releases on the fiduciary duty of advisers may be the most con-
troversial part of the SEC's best interest rule. The exemption from the Ad-
visers Act for brokers is maintained. Critics of Regulation BI have com-
plained that the SEC's releases on the duty of advisers purports to weaken
the fiduciary duty standard applicable to advisers.200
In general, Regulation BI maintains the differences between the regula-
tion of investment advisers and broker-dealers. The policy mantra through-
out the SEC's adopting release is that retail investors should have a choice of
fees and products. Regulation BI establishes a standard of conduct for bro-
ker-dealers when making a recommendation of a securities transaction or
investment strategy to a retail customer, irrespective of wealth. To satisfy the
best interest standard the broker-dealer must comply with four obligations: a
disclosure obligation, a care obligation, a conflict of interest obligation, and
a compliance obligation. According to the SEC's adopting release, breach
of Regulation BI will be judged by a negligence standard but there will be no
197. See Tara Siegel Bernard, S.E.C. Seeks to Require Brokers to Put Their Clients First, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/business/sec-brokers-rules.
html ("Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call it regulation status quo.").
198. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitag Executive, 70
ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 547-48 (2018).
199. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318, 33,318 July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
200. Jackson, Final Rules Governing Investment Advice, supra note 25; see SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 203-07 (1963) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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private right of action created. How this formulation will work out in FINRA
arbitrations remains to be seen. The issue of whether a retail investor can
sue for a breach of Regulation BI is one of the controversies dividing the
Democrats and Republicans. The DOL fiduciary rule provided for such a
claim. 201
It is unlikely that Regulation BI will end the controversy over whether
there should be a fiduciary duty obligation by brokers to their customers.
Some state securities regulators do not believe the SEC's best interest rule is
sufficiently robust to protect investors, and may pass regulations subjecting
brokers to a fiduciary standard with regard to recommendations, advice, and
the selection of account types. 202 The proposing release for Regulation BI
references possible state regulations in conflict with the SEC's best interest
rule and takes no position on whether such state regulations would be
preempted by the SEC's regulation. 20
If there is an attack on Regulation BI in the courts, should a court review
the SEC's cost-benefit analysis? The cost-benefit analysis in the adopting
release for Regulation BI could be a ground for attacking the rule. Ten for-
mer Chief Economists of the SEC sent a comment letter to the Commission
in response to the Regulation BI proposal criticizing the SEC's cost-benefit
analysis. According to the statement by SEC Commissioner RobertJackson
opposing the final rule, the SEC offered no new data to support the rule and
ignored important new evidence regarding the imposition of a fiduciary
standard for broker-dealer recommendationS.204
The destructive power struggle between Democrats and Republicans and
between the Obama White House, the Congress, and the SEC were certainly
not in the interest of retail investors who must fend for themselves when
switching from defined benefit plans to contribution plans like IRAs. It also
seems contrary to the interests of businesses that keep attacking these rules
but must plan to comply. This power struggle is also not in the public interest
since a public that lacks sophistication about investments is unlikely to save
wisely for retirement. Yet, it would not be appropriate for the courts to clean
up this mess.
201. See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,020-21, 21,033 (Apr.
8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
202. Greg lacurci, Galvin to Propose Fiduciay Rule for Massachusetts Brokers, INVESTMENTNEWS
June 14, 2019), https://www.investmentnews.com/galvin-to-propose-fiduciary-rule-for-massa-
chusetts-brokers-79969.
203. It is highly unlikely that an SEC rule can preempt state securities law regulations. See
generall Roberta S. Karmel, Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 105 (1987) (examining state merit regulation).
204. Jackson, Final Rules Governing InvestmentAdvice, supra note 25.
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II. TARGETING INDEPENDENCE
A. Independence and Bi-Partisanship
Independence has always been a hallmark of the SEC's structure and gov-
ernance. As an independent agency, the SEC is supposed to be independent
of the Executive Branch, but more importantly it should operate inde-
pendently from the entities and industry it regulates. The purpose of its inde-
pendence from the President is that regulated entities or persons under inves-
tigation can exert improper pressure on the SEC through the Executive. 205
The President can influence the SEC in a variety of ways from appointing
Chairs and Commissioners sympathetic to the President's political views, to
proposing cuts in the Commission's budget, or by exerting influence on po-
sitions taken by the SEC in Supreme Court cases. 206 Yet, ideally, the Exec-
utive should not be interfering in SEC investigations or prosecutions and
should allow the Commission to exercise its expertise in rulemaking.
The SEC's Rules of Organization, Conduct and Ethics provide:
[The SEC] is an independent Agency, and in performing their duties, members should
exhibit a spirit of firm independence and reject any effort by representatives of the
executive or legislative branches of the government to affect their independent
determination of any matter being considered by the Commission. A member should
not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamor or considerations of personal
popularity or notoriety, so also he should be above fear of unjust criticism by anyone. 20 7
In recent years, the SEC's independence has been undermined by parti-
san politics. By law, the SEC Chairman is appointed by the President, but
no more than three out of five commissioners can be from the President's
party. Historically, SEC commissioners came from a wide variety of back-
grounds and were respected for their expertise. Although they may have had
differences of opinion on Commission actions, these disagreements were not
necessarily partisan. In recent years, however, appointments of Democratic
and Republican commissioners have been paired and many commissioners
have had a background as staffers in congressional committees with SEC
oversight. Qualifications are based on ideological correctness and party loy-
alty rather than expertise. This has led to very contentious and partisan
205. An example of such corrupt interference with the SEC's work was an effort by the
Nixon White House to quash an SEC investigation of Robert Vesco, a notorious white-collar
criminal. Sadly, this scandal led to the resignation and disbarment of an SEC Chairman. See
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 66-67 (1982).
206. StevenJ. Cleveland, Resurrecting Court Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Definition of "Security", 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 273, 285-92 (2013).
207. 17 C.F.R. § 200.58 (2019).
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decision making, with many 3-2 decisions, or even worse, 2-1 votes on im-
portant issues. Dissents have been designed to encourage appeals to the D.C.
Circuit to overturn SEC rules. This partisanship has undermined the SEC's
mission and credibility. It has made it difficult for the SEC to complete rule-
making, even when it is mandated by statute. Furthermore, both Republi-
cans and Democrats have fomented these partisan squabbles.
Efforts to inflict Presidential control on SEC rulemaking through cost-ben-
efit analysis have been discussed above. The Carter Administration contem-
plated a different kind of initiative which threatened SEC control of its own
litigation. 208 The securities laws provide authority for the SEC to bring injunc-
tive actions in the district courts to prevent or curtail violations of those laws,
but there is no express provision dealing with whether the SEC may represent
itself or if it is required to be represented by the Department ofJustice. 209 His-
torically, the SEC has represented itself in the district and circuit courts, in
cases where the SEC is the plaintiff, or where the SEC or an SEC commis-
sioner or staffer is a defendant, and in amicus curie briefs. When a case is in
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Solicitor General takes charge of the matter, but
an SEC attorney usually writes the brief and argues the case. 210 Not all agen-
cies enjoy this independence. The SEC's authority to conduct its own litiga-
tion has been upheld in many court decisions.21' It was also confirmed by
Congress in hearings involving the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act legislation. 212
President Carter, in the name of greater governmental efficiency, pro-
posed giving control of SEC litigation to the Department ofJustice. This
grab for power came to nothing as Congress was disinclined to divest the
SEC of its ability to independently litigate. The rationale for the SEC's con-
trol of litigation and its independence generally was articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1947: When the SEC acts in an area in which it brings to
bear its "administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of
the . . . facts," its judgment is one which it is "best equipped to make" and
which is "entitled to the greatest amount of weight."2 1 3
More direct attacks on the SEC's independence originate from cases in-
voking the Appointments Clause. These cases are based to some extent on
the unitary executive theory. The theory of the unitary executive, simply
208. See supra text accompanying note 14.
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(a), 78u(e) (2012).
210. Letter from Harvey L. Pitt, Gen. Counsel, SEC, to Mr. F.T. Davis, Jr., Dir., Gen.
Gov't Div., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget 2 (Dec. 6, 1977) (on file with author).
211. Id. at 2-7 (on file with author). It was also confirmed by Congress.
212. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 9-10 (1977).
213. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
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stated, is the belief that the Constitution established an executive branch with
complete control over all officials implementing the law. 214 Under this theory,
a president has "plenary power to control administration and execution of the
laws," and restrictions on that power are anathema to the Constitution.2 1 5
Unitary executive theorists take their cues first from the Vesting Clause of
Article II, which declares that "[t] he executive Power shall be vested in a Pres-
ident," 216 and the Take Care Clause, which tasks the President with seeing
that "the Laws be faithfully executed."217 Unitary executive theorists conceive
of a hierarchical executive authority with the President sitting at its head.2 18
There are gradations of the unitary executive ideology, the strongest of
which grants a President full and absolute power to execute the laws, directly
control the execution of those laws through his subordinates, and remove
them at will. 219 Lesser forms of the unitary executive would grant the Presi-
dent veto authority over discretionary use of executive power by lesser offi-
cials, or to remove, at will, principal officers with whom he or she disa-
grees. 220 A still weaker form of the theory grants Congress "a wide degree of
authority to structure government as it sees fit," 221 while stronger forms in-
creasingly require direct Presidential administrative control and bar congres-
sional interference with Presidential authority over executive officers.222
One critic of the unitary executive theory has stated that it "is a theory no
longer . . . . Each President exceeds his predecessor's control of the Fourth
Branch. 'Presidential administration' is morphing into autocracy."223 She
blames this development on congressional and agency inertia, and the impo-
sition ofjudicial rules on agency rulemaking.224
214. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitag Ex-
ecutive, Plural Judiciag, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992) (discussing Congress's powers
around executive officers); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and theAdministration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (exploring the concept of a unitary executive).
215. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 214, at 7.
216. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
217. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 214, at 1165-66.
218. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 214, at 1165-66.
219. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution's Unitay Executive, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 701 (2009).
220. Id.
221. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 214, at 9.
222. Id. at 8-9; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 214, at 1165-66; Prakash, supra note 219,
at 701.
223. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitay Executive, 70
ADMIN. L.REV. 515, 516 (2018).
224. Id. at 516-17.
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B. Administrative Law Judges
After the SEC determines that an enforcement investigation has uncovered
evidence of a violation of the securities laws, the agency can institute an action
for an injunction in a federal district court, refer the matter for criminal prose-
cution to the Department ofJustice, or institute an administrative proceeding
before an Administrative LawJudge (ALJ). Until 2018, ALJs were hired by the
Commission's Office of Human Resources with input from the chief ALJ and
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. They were thus subject to compet-
itive selection and were nonpolitical. 225 The Commission then had no direct
role in hiring the ALJs. 226 Even though ALJs were SEC employees, their hiring
process and other procedures were an effort to maintain their independence.
The administrative proceeding as an in-house forum has been in existence
since the SEC was created, but until very recently was used only for cases
against registered entities in the securities business, their associated persons,
and accountants and lawyers. However, Dodd-Frank gave the SEC ex-
panded authority to impose civil monetary penalties against persons associ-
ated with unregistered entities, for example, hedge fund employees or direc-
tors of public corporations, so that such proceedings could be brought before
an SEC ALJ. 227 It also gave the SEC the authority to impose bans on persons
in the securities industry from associating across the entire industry.2 28 This
increased scope for administrative proceedings given to the SEC by Dodd-
Frank, led to increased criticisms of ALJ cases.
Several constitutional grounds were suggested as ways to attack the use of
ALJs. The most viable was the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2,
which provides that the President shall appoint all 'Officers ofthe United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law,' but that 'Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper in the ... Heads ofDepartments."' 229
Other attacks were based on deprivation of the right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment, violation of the Due Process Clause due to the combi-
nation of prosecutorial and judicial powers in the SEC, and nondelegation. 210
225. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). See Kent Bamett, AgainstAdministrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1643, 1654 (2016) (describing the process by which administrative law judges (ALJs)
are appointed).
226. Alexander I. Platt, SECAdministrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 Bus. LAw. 1,
4 (2015-16).
227. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-65 (2010).
228. § 925, 124 Stat. at 1850-51.
229. Platt, supra note 226, at 14.
230. Id. at 17-22.
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In 2013, the SEC charged Raymond Lucia, who used his investment com-
pany to market a retirement strategy called "Buckets of Money" to prospec-
tive clients, with violating the Investment Advisers Act. 23 ' Lucia's case was
heard before ALJ Cameron Elliot, who determined following a hearing that
Lucia had committed the violations and imposed substantial civil penalties
and a lifetime industry ban. 232 Lucia appealed to the SEC, arguing that the
entire proceeding against him was constitutionally invalid because Judge El-
liot as an "Officer of the United States" had not been appointed through the
permissible mechanisms.2 3 The Commission concluded that ALJs were
"mere employees" not governed by the Appointments Clause-and thus
could be selected by persons other than those enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. 23 4 Lucia's argument was then rebuffed twice more: first by a three judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit23 5 and then by an en banc rehearing where the ten
judge panel divided evenly. 236 Asking for a resolution of the circuit split be-
tween D.C. and the Tenth Circuit,23 7 Lucia made his way to the Supreme
Court, where he finally found success.23 8
In 2018, the Supreme Court held in Lucia v. SEC23 9 that the SEC's ALJs
qualified as "Officers of the United States" under the Appointments Clause
of the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, meaning that they could
only be appointed by the mechanisms outlined in the Constitution. 240 The
Constitution limits the authority to appoint officers to "Courts of Law," or
"Heads of Departments" to the President. 241 The Commission's ALJs were
instead selected by staff.242
Justice Kagan, writing for a seven person majority, concluded that the
Commission's ALJs fall within the definition of "Officers of the United
231. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
232. Id. at 2049-50.
233. Id. at 2050.
234. Id.
235. Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283-89 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that the president
does not need to appoint the SEC's ALJs because their decisions are not final).
236. Lucia v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (declining to review the case
in a per curiam opinion).
237. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Com-
mission's ALJs were "inferior officers" and thus they "held [their] office [s] in conflict with the
Appointments Clause .... .").
238. SEC v. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (reversing thejudgment of the Court of
Appeals and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion).
239. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
240. Id. at 2049.
241. U.S. CoNST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
242. 138 S. Ct. at 2049.
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States" rather than "lesser functionaries."24 3 In determining thisJustice Ka-
gan relied on three previous Supreme Court rulings to form the framework
of her analysis: United States v. Germaine;244 Buckly v. Valeo;245 and Frytag v.
Commissioner.246 The Court in Germaine held that "civil surgeons" were merely
employees, reasoning that to be an "Officer of the United States," one must
hold a "continuing and permanent" position, rather than an "occasional and
intermittent" one. 247 Nearly a century later, the Court in Buckly added an-
other element to the test: A position is governed by the Appointments Clause
where the employees "exercise [d] significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States." 248
Frytag held that the Tax Court's special trial judges were officers because
they: (1) held continuing office with ongoing and permanent duties, and (2)
had significant authority because they presided over adversarial hearings. 249
Despite the fact that those Tax Court judges did not issue final decisions, they
were still officers. Applying this to Lucia, the SEC's ALJs clearly held contin-
uing office established by law, a fact all conceded. 25 0 Further, like the special
trial judges in Frytag, the ALJs presided with authority and discretion over
adversarial hearings, wielding "nearly all the tools of federal trial judges." 2 5 '
The ALJs were arguably even more independent than their Frytag analogs,
Kagan noted, because the Commission does not always, though it can, re-
view their decisions.2 5 2 Therefore, "[i]f the Tax Court's [special trial judges]
are officers ... then the Commission's ALJs must be too." 2 5 3 Lucia's hearing
was therefore an "adjudication tainted with an appointments violation," the
remedy for which was a new, constitutionally valid hearing before someone
other than ALJ Elliott. 254
The politicization of ALJs accomplished by Lucia is unfortunate. If ALJs
become political appointees they are likely to have less expertise and less in-
dependence than previously. Furthermore, Lucia, like some of the other cases
discussed in this Article, demonstrated a total indifference to the substantive
243. Id. at 2051 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)).
244. 99 U.S. 508 (1879).
245. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
246. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
247. 99 U.S. at 51 1-12.
248. 424 U.S. at 126.
249. 501 U.S. at 891-92 (discussing the judicial functions of the Tax Court's special
trial judges).
250. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2053-54.
253. d. at 2054.
254. d. at 2055.
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frauds committed by the defendant or the possible implications for the ad-
ministration of the federal government's many agencies with numerous ALJs.
This is one of the many problems with the type of judicial review of cases
coming from administrative agencies like the SEC. The Court is a generalist
reviewer with no accountability or responsibility for the smooth functioning
of the administrative state.
C. The Public Company Accounting Overszght Board
The constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) fared better than the SEC's ALJs, although the PCAOB was also
subject to a serious attack pursuant to the Appointments Clause. The
PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation composed of five members, appointed by
the SEC after consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System and the Secretary of the Treasury. The PCAOB's mission is to
"oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect investors and the
public interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports."255 The PCAOB also oversees audits of broker-dealers. The SEC
approves the Board's rules, standards, and budgets.
The SEC was frustrated for many years in its efforts to effectively regulate
the accounting profession because accountants were powerful and well-orga-
nized and because the securities laws did not contain a strong framework for
the regulation of auditing. The accounting profession was self-regulated rather
than directly regulated by the SEC. Although the SEC disciplined accountants
pursuant to Rule 2(e), after the fact of auditing failures, the Commission's au-
thority for establishing auditing standards was weak. After the Enron and
WorldCom scandals, and numerous accounting restatements, Sarbanes-Ox-
ley created the PCAOB to better regulate auditing. 256 The PCAOB was in-
tentionally set up as an independent body to be insulated from interference by
the accounting profession for the objective of more closely monitoring the ac-
counting firms which audit public companies under the federal securities
laws.257 The Board was placed under the oversight authority of the SEC,258
and Commissioners could remove the Board members only for good cause
255. About the PC0B, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., https://pcaobus.org/About/
Pages/defauh.aspx (last visited May 14, 2020).
256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7213-15 (2012); see Steven B. Harris, Bd. Member of the PCAOB,
Remarks to Kennesaw State Graduate Student Meeting (May 16, 2013), https://pcao-
bus.org/News/Speech/Pages/05 162013_Kennesaw.aspx.
257. 15 U.S.C. § 7211; Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 484-85 (2010).
258. 15 U.S.C § 7217(b)-(c).
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with a formal Commission finding with "notice and opportunity for a hearing"
which was subject to judicial review. 259
Not surprisingly, this double independence structure was attacked as violat-
ing the President's appointments power. In 2010, the Supreme Court held
that the restraints placed on removal of Board members of the PCAOB vio-
lated Constitutional separation of powers by failing to sufficiently place the
Board under the President's control. 260 ChiefJusticeJohn Roberts found that
the protections against removal afforded to Board members made the PCAOB
unaccountable to executive authority, and thus, at odds with the Constitutional
mandate that the President see that all laws are "faithfully executed." 26 1
The constitutional challenge to the Board was brought after it formally
investigated the Nevada accounting firm Beckstead and Watts, LLP.262
Watts and the Free Enterprise Fund (a nonprofit organization to which the
firm belonged), sued the Board, asserting that the organization was constitu-
tionally invalid and should be enjoined from exercising its authority. 263 The
plaintiffs argued that: (1) the appointment of Board members was so far re-
moved from Presidential control as to contravene separation of powers; and
(2) that the appointment of Board members violated the Appointments
Clause. 264 The District Court granted summary judgment to the govern-
ment. 265 The D.C. Circuit affirmed this decision with a vigorous dissent by
now-Supreme CourtJustice Brett Kavanaugh. 266
The pivotal issue was whether protections against at-will removal of Board
members contravened separation of powers. 267 Executive authority extends
to the "general administrative control of those executing the laws," as con-
firmed in Myers v. United States,268 and that must include the "power of remov-
ing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible." 269 A line of case
law supports limitations on executive control over both the principal and in-
ferior officers of agencies like the FTC, which the Court in Humphrey's Executor
259. § 7217(d)(3); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486.
260. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492, 495-98.
261. Id. at 484.
262. Id. at 487.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 487-88.
265. Id. at 488. The United States had intervened to defend the constitutionality of Sar-
banes-Oxley. Id.
266. Id.; Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685-
715 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,J., dissenting).
267. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at492, 502-08.
268. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
269. Id. at 117, 164.
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v. United States 270 distinguished as "quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial" and
not "purely executive." 27' The permission also extends to inferior executive
officers like independent counsels who report to the Attorney General.27 2
The Court in Free Enterprise Fund, however, drew the line at restraining the
president's removal powers over inferior officers any further.2 73 If, the Court
reasoned, the Commission could remove a Board member at will and the Pres-
ident could then "hold the Commission to account for its supervision of the
Board," that would not unduly limit the President's removal power and re-
sponsibility for executing the laws. 274 Sarbanes-Oxley, however, prevented
at-will removal, leaving the President unable to hold the Commission account-
able for the actions of the PCAOB.275 The Commissioners could be account-
able only for their determination of good cause or lack thereof, a determination
the President could only upend if it "constitute [d] 'inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office."' 276 The Court described that structure as "not
merely add[ing] to the Board's independence, but transform[ing] it."277 The
diminution of executive power was, in the Court's view, untenable and "in-
compatible with the Constitution's separation of powers."278 The Court did,
however, find that the tenure provisions were severable from the rest of Sar-
banes-Oxley, which remained in effect "with these tenure restrictions ex-
cised." 279 Watts and Free Enterprise Fund's remaining challenges to the Board
under the Appointments Clause were rejected. 280
Although the PCAOB survived its destruction, it was a very close call.
Congressional efforts to insulate this new regulator from improper influence
by the accounting profession created a complex agency within an agency.
Whether this structure will prevent future accounting failures like Enron and
WorldCom remains to be seen.
270. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
271. Id. at 628-29; see also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (upholding
limitations on the removal of inferior officers); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492-93 (summa-
rizing precedent).
272. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 663 (1988).
273. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495-98.
274. Id. at 495-96.
275. Id. at 496.
276. Id. (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 498.
279. Id. at 509.
280. Id. at 510-14.
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III. THE END OF DEFERENCE?
The holding of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 281
is that when a statutory provision is ambiguous, if the interpretation of the
statute by a federal agency is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute,"282 the agency's interpretation is to be given "controlling weight."283
Although many scholars believe such review is consistent with whether a de-
cision is arbitrary or capricious under the APA,284 the deferential review re-
quired by Chevron generally is outcome determinative. 285 Chevron deference is
based on the rationale that judges are not experts and the judiciary is non-
political. Therefore, agencies should resolve the "competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light
of everyday realities." 286
Since Chevron involved an executive branch agency and the language of
the Court referred to the Chief Executive as the appropriate political branch
to make policy choices, Randolph May has argued that Chevron deference
should not be accorded to independent agencies since they are "less politi-
cally accountable than the executive branch with respect to their policymak-
ing actions[.]"287 This argument is a non sequitur since federal judges are
less politically accountable than the Executive Branch or independent agen-
cies. In addition, why should a generalist judge's views trump the decision
of an agency exercising expert judgement?
May also argues that independent agencies deserve less deference on a
separation-of-powers principle.2 8 8 But this seems a variation on general skep-
ticism of independent agencies because they are more closely tied to Con-
gress than to the Executive.289 This alignment does not make them less ac-
countable. It is basically a variation of the unitary executive theory discussed
in Part II above.
281. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
282. Id. at 843.
283. Id. at 844.
284. APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 561-570a, 701-706, 706(2)(A) (2012); see RandolphJ.
May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron Deference and Fox, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 433, 434 n.5 (2010).
285. Id. at 434 n.6.
286. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
287. May, supra note 284, at 435.
288. Id.
289. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 63-64 (1986) (ex-
plaining and dismissing the "arm of Congress" theory of independent agencies).
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Closely related to Chevron deference is Auer290 or Seminole Rock29' deference.
These cases allow agencies to interpret their own regulations if the regula-
tions are ambiguous. In Kisor v. Willkie292 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Auer,
but Justice Gorsuch, in a long and contentious concurring opinion argued
that Auer should be reversed.2 93 He also suggested that the Court should re-
view Chevron and overturn that case. 294 Other justices have made similar ar-
guments and encouraged cases that would undermine or reverse Chevron.295
In Kisor v. Wilkie, 296 the Supreme Court took up the question of whether
case law establishing the doctrine of deferring to agencies' reasonable inter-
pretations of ambiguous regulations should remain good law.297 The Court,
in an opinion byjustice Elena Kagan, ultimately affirmed the doctrine, called
either the Auer 298 or Seminole Rock doctrine,299 but established and elaborated
on its limitations and applications. 00 The Kisor opinion established that, for
Auer deference to apply: (1) the regulation must remain genuinely ambiguous
after a court has "exhaust[ed] all the 'traditional tools' of construction;" 0 '
and (2) the agency reading must be reasonable and within the bounds of per-
missible interpretation established by the court's attempts to interpret the
rule. 0 2 Once proven to be a reasonable interpretation of a genuinely am-
biguous rule, the interpretation must meet three more criteria for the
290. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
291. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
292. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
293. Id. at 2425-48 (Gorsuch,J., concurring).
294. Id. at 2446 n.l 14.
295. ButJusdce Scalia supported Chevron deference at one time. See generally Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Defterence to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE LJ. 511 (1989) (arguing Chevron
deference was not a new concept when the court issued its opinion in 1984).
296. The underlying case concerned James Kisor's application to the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs (VA) for disability benefits for post-traumadc stress disorder (PTSD)-initially de-
nied in 1982. In 2006, his claim was granted but the benefits were not retroactive. Although
both parties' interpretations of the pertinent regulatory language appeared reasonable, under
Auer deference the VA's interpretation governed.
297. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
298. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997).
299. The doctrine provides as a necessary part of rulemaking that agencies' interpreta-
tions of their own ambiguous regulatory language are given primacy, where those interpreta-
tions are reasonable.
300. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945) (when the "mean-
ing of the words used [in a regulation] is in doubt . .. the ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation").
301. 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
302. Id. at 2415-16.
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presumption in its favor to hold. It must be (1) an authoritative rather than
informal or unofficial interpretation on (2) a matter implicating the agency's
specific substantive expertise, and (3) be the result of a "fair and considered
judgment." 03 Only then is Auer deference given.
In weighing Kisor's argument that Auer and Seminole Rock, and the estab-
lished doctrine described above should be overturned,Justice Kagan turned
to the principles of stare decisis. To overrule the doctrine required more
than overturning just Auer, but "a 'long line of precedents'-each one reaf-
firming the rest and going back 75 years or more." 304 Further, upending the
doctrine would introduce serious instability into the law.30 5 This doctrine, as
described, survived Kisor's attack on it. However, his specific case was re-
manded for determination consistent with the above-outlined limitations on
Auer: specifically to require the Federal Circuit to exhaust all its interpretive
tools in concluding the rule to be ambiguous and to find whether, if reason-
able, this interpretation is of the category owed judicial deference.30 6
In his concurring opinion in Kisor, Justice Gorsuch takes a pot shot at the
administrative state307 and eliminating Chevron and Auer deference seems to
be part of a conservative agenda. A bill to amend § 706 of the APA, called
the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, would have demolished
Chevron by requiring a de novo standard of review for "all relevant questions
of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provi-
sionsH and rules."308 It would also have overturned Auer by disallowing agen-
cies to interpret their own regulations. If passed, such a bill probably would
have pernicious effects on SEC rulemaking and give business interests even
more leverage than they have now when challenging SEC rules.
CONCLUSION
Investor protection and capital formation are important components of fi-
nancial regulation. If the SEC is undermined by power struggles between the
Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary, or partisan gridlock over regulation,
the SEC will fail to achieve these important goals. Many on the right, led by
President Trump, are openly trying to destroy the administrative state, but
303. Id. at 2416-18.
304. Id. at 2422.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2423-24.
307. Id. at 2446-47 (Gorsuch,J., concurring) ("[I]n the 2 1st century, '[t]he administrative
state wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life.' Among other things, it
produces 'reams of regulations'-so many that they dwarf the statutes enacted by Congress.").
308. Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2(2) (2016).
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the left is not blameless. The Financial Choice Act of 2016,309 proposed by
Representative Jeb Hensarling, would subject not only SEC rulemaking but
SEC enforcement to severe congressional review. The Enforcement Division
would have to verify that its actions are within the SEC authority and con-
sistent with the APA. The economic consequences of a civil penalty on an
issuer would have to be considered. This idea of a cost-benefit analysis for
enforcement cases strikes me as ludicrous. The recent move by Democrats to
prevent the SEC from administering its Regulation BI is a similar partisan
interference with the SEC's regulation.
An even more trenchant example of partisan political pressure exerted on
the SEC was conflicting Republican and Democratic reactions to the petition
for rulemaking on public company disclosure of political contributions. After
the Supreme Court decided Citizens United,310 the Committee on Disclosure of
Political Spending, co-chaired by Professor Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law
School and Robert J. Jackson of Columbia Law School-subsequently an
SEC commissioner-sent a petition to the SEC to start a rulemaking pro-
ceeding to require disclosure of corporate political contributions.3 1' This pe-
tition and its favorable response were prompted in part by a statement in Cit-
izens United by Justice Kennedy. He noted that "[w]ith the advent of the
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and cit-
izens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters."31 2
Although repeal of Citizens United has become a political rallying cry for
many Democrats, the issue of improper political influence coming from cam-
paign contributions and lobbying activities is not that simple. A lot of "dirty
money" comes from individual donations. A lot of corporate contributions
come from political actions committees (PACs) where employees decide where
money should be spent. Extensive lobbying is done by trade associations. The
SEC received millions of comments supporting the Bebchuk-Jackson petition
from a wide array of the public public interest groups, federal law makers,
trade unions, and major investment firms. The SEC also received many ad-
verse comments. Also, political contribution disclosures are already required
to be made to the Federal Election Commission. This issue was essentially
political; it compelled the SEC to enforce all worthwhile (or not so worthwhile)
309. H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §§ 323, 415, 631 (2016).
310. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
311. Letter from the Comm. on Disclosure of Corp. Political Spending to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 1-2 (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-
637.pdf (Petition for Rulemaking); see also Lucian A. Bebchuck & Robert J. Jackson, Shining
Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. LJ. 923, 967 (2013).
312. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
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federal regulations, or corporate activities by way of its disclosure rules can
become a quagmire. 13
In 2013 and 2014, there were bills introduced in Congress to compel the
SEC to mandate political contributions disclosures and bills to prevent the
SEC from mandating such disclosures.3 14 A provision written into the policy
riders for the 2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill, passed on December 18,
2015, explicitly prohibited the SEC from using any funds to finalize political
constitution disclosure rules during the fiscal year 2016.315 A group of con-
gressional leaders, led by Sen. Charles Schumer, informed the SEC via an
open letter that the language of the bill did not prohibit the Commission from
preparing, researching, or investigating potential rules, and urged the SEC
to remain committed to the issue.
At least one nonprofit organization sought to force the SEC to enact a
political contribution disclosure rule, when the SEC failed to act. On Janu-
ary 4, 2016,Judge Rosemary Collyer dismissed the suit, writing that "[s]ince
the SEC has not denied the petition and ... [the nonprofit organization] has
not asserted that the SEC 'failed to act in response to a clear legal duty,' it
follows that he failed to state a valid APA claim upon which relief can be
granted." 316 The decision essentially holds that the SEC is not obligated to
respond to petitions by nonprofit organizations and private citizens seeking
to set the SEC's rulemaking agenda.317
The furor over the Bebchuk-Jackson political spending petition did not
subside after these events. The nominations of two SEC commissioners to
fill vacancies were held up in the Senate by Democrats because they did not
testify during their confirmation hearings that they would push forward on a
rulemaking advancing the petition. One of them, Republican Hester Pierce
who once worked in the Senate, was re-nominated by President Trump. The
313. See, e.g., Rulemaking Regarding Conflict Minerals, supra Part I.D.
314. Rob Tricchinelli, House Committee Approves $1.4B for SEC, Teeing Up Conflict with Senate on
Funding, BLOOMBERG L. June 30, 2014), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/doc-
ument/X80JAEUS000000?criteriaid=dd6074b88c840b76a5491dbl4b680726&se
archGuid=4cbba21f-923d-4f51 -b966-732c8b4e3e30; Democrats Unveil Legislation to Require Share-
holder Say on Political Spending, BLOOMBERGL. (Apr. 29, 2013), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/s
ecuriides-law/democrats-unveil-legislation-to-require-shareholder-say-on-politcal-spend
ing?context=search&index= 0.
315. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 div. 0 § 707, 129 Stat.
2242, 3029-30 (2015).
316. Silberstein v. SEC, 153 F. Supp. 3d 233, 239 (D.D.C. 2016).
317. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt a Democrat in a Wall StreetJournal op-ed
asserted that the SEC's agenda should not be decided by rulemaking petitions. Arthur Levitt,
Jr., Let the SECSetIs Own Agenda, WALL ST.J. (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/aricles/let-
the-sec-set-its-own-agenda- 1477261742.
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other, a Democrat, Lisa Fairfax, was never confirmed. Even worse, Senator
Elizabeth Warren suggested that Chair Mary Jo White be fired as SEC
Chairman by President Obama and demoted to a Commissioner because
Chair White refused to engage in rulemaking to compel public companies to
disclose their political contributions.3 18 Missing from this pique on the part
of Senator Warren was the fact that the SEC was prohibited from doing so
by legislation that Senator Warren voted for. Senator Warren also criticized
Chair White for embarking on a project to streamline SEC disclosure policy
and improve public company reporting,3 19 a project prompted by mandates
from Congress in the JOBS Act and the Fixing America's Surface Transpor-
tation (FAST) Act. 20
The suggestion that the Chair of the SEC be fired seems to be an election
year gambit. When he was running for President, SenatorJohn McCain as-
serted that if he were President, he would fire the then Chair of the SEC for
failing to prevent the 2008 financial crisis. The SEC is supposed to be a col-
legial agency of nonpartisan experts. Instead, it has become an agency riven
by partisanship due to politicians trying to score points and gain publicity, and
judges who are more attentive to business than governmental interests.
Four former Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board recently expressed their
convictions that "the Fed and its chair must be permitted to act inde-
pendently and in the best interests of the economy, free of short-term political
pressures and, in particular, without the threat of removal or demotion of
Fed leaders for political reasons." 321 Their reasons were that "an economy
is strongest and functions best when the central bank acts independently of
short-term political pressures and relies solely on sound economic principles
and data." 322 It could similarly be argued that the capital markets are strong-
est and function best when the SEC is able to act independently and relies
on sound legal and policy principles and data.
In her last public address before resigning as SEC Chairman, Mary Jo
White pleaded for the SEC's independence as vital to serving a leadership
role in the broader financial regulatory regime. She stated:
318. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to President Barack Obama (Oct. 14, 2016), https:
//www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/20 16-10-
14_SEC_Letter to%20POTUSOCR.pdf.
319. Id. at 6; see Concept Release, Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regu-
lation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210,
229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249).
320. Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 72002, 129 Stat. 1312, 1790 (2015).
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I strongly believe that the agency's independence has been critical in allowing it to use
its expertjudgment to do what is best for investors and the markets-a task that could
otherwise be rendered impossible by the whims ofpolitical pressure or the public mood.
The Commission, in fact, was created as an independent expert agency in 1934
precisely because Congress identified a need for that strength in overseeing the
American capital markets. 323
The President's power to remove agency members from office only for
"cause" has long been considered a key feature of agency independence by
academics. I believe that two other earmarks of independence-agency con-
trol of its own litigation and independent funding are more important as a
practical matter. Although the SEC takes more money into the U.S. Treasury
than its budget, from registration fees and fines, the SEC budget is subject to
annual appropriations by Congress. Serious efforts to insulate the SEC from
partisan and Wall Street interference by giving the agency independent fund-
ing authority floundered in 1977 due to congressional opposition and once
again in Dodd-Frank due to Democratic opposition.
The concept of agency independence generally has meant freedom from
control by the Executive Branch, based on delegation of congressional powers.
Commissions like the SEC are often considered "arms" of Congress and, in
any event, are accountable to Congress for their success or failure. Congress
has many legitimate ways to influence the work of the SEC, the most important
of which is fixing the Commission's budget. Congressional oversight commit-
tees can also exert a strong influence on the work of the SEC.3 24 Yet, the courts
have also recognized that some degree of independence from Congress is also
important to insulate these agencies from inappropriate pressures.325
The Trump White House and some conservative judges would like to de-
stroy the administrative state. Members of Congress both Republicans and
Democrats-are threatening the SEC's independence. Agencies are often crit-
icized for having been captured by the industries they regulate, but agency cap-
ture occurs by way of congressional pressure and legislative mischief making.
Also, at fault are judicial decisions second guessing the SEC's expertise and
ultimately adding to the agency's ossification and prolix rulemaking releases.
I do not believe the SEC is perfect, but it could do a better job as a regulator
if it were allowed to operate as a nonpartisan, independent expert collegial body.
323. MaryJo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the Economic Club of New York: The SEC
after the Financial Crisis: Protecting Investors Preserving Markets Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/the-sec-after-the-financial-crisis.html.
324. Cleveland, supra note 206, at 293-97.
325. See D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see
also Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 954, 963-64 (5th Cir. 1966).
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